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GENERAL PROBLEMS

Three events mark the three year period surveyed in this article.'
The first is Florida's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code containing a number of conflict rules. 2 The second is the rather large and varied
array of legislative enactments affecting conflicts law adopted by the
recent Florida legislature. The third significant event, though less authoritative, is the fact that the draft of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws is nearing completion.'
No recent Florida cases dealt with characterization or renvoi,
hence discussion may begin with the conflict status of statutes of limitations. As a general rule, these statutes are classified as procedural" and,
therefore, governed by the lex fori. This rule is inapplicable, however,
if (1) the forum's borrowing statute requires the application of the
statute of limitations in force in the jurisdiction where the cause of
action arose (as does Florida) 5 or the statute of limitations in force in the
defendant's domicile, or a combination of these, and (2) the period of
limitations in either jurisdiction happens to be shorter than that of the
forum. The general rule may also be affected by an agreement between
the parties shortening the period within which an action may be brought,
or by the fact that a period of limitation has been so closely interwoven
into an applicable foreign substantive statute as to become an integral
part of it, and, therefore, a substantive matter in cases governed by the
statute. 6
Crew members employed by an air carrier brought a diversity action in the federal district court in New York against the aircraft's
manufacturer to recover for injuries sustained in Florida, allegedly
caused by the manufacturer's breach of an implied warranty. The air1. The previous survey article, Bayitch, Conflict of Laws in Florida, 1957-1963, 18
U. MmAmxI L. REv. 269 (1963), subsequently cited as Survey I, should be considered in conjunction with the present study. Generally, recent developments in the conflicts field have
been discussed by Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process (1965); Gorfinkel, Conflict of Laws:
A Survey of Past and Contemporary Theory, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 21 (1964); Kegel, The
Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECuEI DES CoURs 95 (Hague 1964) ; Reese, Discussion of
Major Areas of Choice of Law, 111 Recueil des Cours 316 (Hague 1964); Leflar, ChoiceInfluencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 267 (1966).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 67.1-101-680.10-107 (1965), to take effect on January 1, 1967.
3. Reese, Conflict of Laws & the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679
(1963).
4. See Survey 1,at 271; CERVERA, THE STATUTE or LMarrATioNs IN AMERICAN CONFLICTS
or LAWS (1966). The substantive nature of the statute of frauds was confirmed in Miami
Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Shaleck, 182 So.2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
5. FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1965).
6. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904); Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663
(6th Cir. 1942); Rodzik v. New York Cent. R.R., 169 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
On tolling Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966). In Frost v. Davis, 346
F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1965), 356 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1966) the court held that in an action
involving exploration and development of petroleum property in Cuba, the "cause of action
accrued not when [plaintiff] first demanded payment, but when [defendant] first refused it;
thus, the suit was not barred by either the Florida or the Texas statute."
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craft had been manufactured and delivered in California. The case involved an interpretation of the New York borrowing statute. On appeal,
the court held7 that the cause of action arose in California where the
alleged breach occurred, and not in Florida, the situs of the accident.
According to the applicable New York borrowing statute, the one-year
California statute of limitations controlled the disposition of the case.
After a tortuous meandering from court to court,' the United States
Supreme Court finally sustained 9 the right of a forum (Florida) to hold
invalid an agreement to shorten the period of limitations within which
an action could be brought in a situation where the agreement was
void under the lex fori but valid under the lex loci actus (Illinois). The
court found no Illinois cases "extending the rule [permitting the shortening of the limitation period by parties' agreement] into other states
whenever claims on Illinois contracts are sought to be enforced there,"
nor did the Court consider the "activities in the State of the forum
[Florida] . . . too slight and too casual . . . to make the application of
local law [consistent] with due process."' 0 It further justified its decision on the ground that, as the defendant insurer knew, the floater
policies, involved in the action, insured property anywhere in the world.
"[S]ince the company was licensed to do business in Florida, it must
have known it . . . [might] be sued there."" Thus, the forum state
had "ample contacts with the present transaction and the parties to
satisfy any conceivable requirement of full faith and credit or of due
process."' 2
A different rule was applied in an action against a maritime carrier
to recover for personal injuries sustained on a sea voyage. A contractual
reduction of the period of limitation to one year was given effect on
the ground that "although this is a common law action in a state court,
it is governed by general maritime law . . . [and] the limitation provisions provided by section 95.03, Florida Statutes . . . do not apply."' 3
To illustrate the effect of incorporating a period of limitation into
7. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964); but see Public Admin.
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y., 1963).
8. See Survey I, at 273.
9. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Survey I, at 273. Query: what
effect, if any, will the provision of the Uniform Commercial Code [FLA. STAT. § 672.2-725
(1965) J permitting the parties to "reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year"
have on Florida public policy?
10. Id. at 181.
11. Id. at 182.
12. Id. at 183.
13. Foresman v. Eastern Steamship Corp., 177 So.2d 887 (3d Dist. 1965). Cf. Schwartz
v. S.S. Nassau, 345 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965).
No recent Florida cases deal with public policy, except State of Minnesota v. Taran,
164 So.2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), discussed later. Cf. McMahon v. Carribbean Mills, Inc.,
332 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1964). Gonzales v. Trujillo, 179 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965)
(promise to pay for smuggling money out of Cuba enforceable in Florida).
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a statute creating a substantive right, an earlier case may be examined. 4
An action was brought against an aircraft manufacturer for an alleged
breach of warranty. In applying the law of the place where the accident occurred, Louisiana, the court stated that "a statute of limitations
extinguishes the right [to bring an action] only when such statute is
peremptive, rather than prescriptive."'" The latter merely bars the
remedy; the former destroys the claim. The right to maintain the action
was created by article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, and the period
of limitations within which the action could be brought in the Louisiana
courts was delineated by articles 3536, 3537, and 3541 of the same code.
The court of appeals disagreed with the appellee's argument that these
articles were "so intimately and necessarily related to article 2315 creating the tort action here involved that the three should be read with
the same effect as if they all constituted one statute."' 6 It noted that
the provision fixing the period of limitation was contained in a separate
article of the Louisiana Code, that the limitation statute itself used the
word "prescribed," and that decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court
required a party who wished to avail himself of its provisions to specifically allege the statutory limitation. These facts indicated that the
Louisiana statute "fixing a period of limitation of one year for the bringing of this action in Louisiana was one of prescription [and, therefore,
procedural] and not of peremption,"'1' thus opening the door for the
application of the two-year period of the lex fori, Texas.
It may be added that Florida has not yet adopted a direct action
statute, and no case has discussed the local effect of a foreign-created
claim impressed with a right of direct action against the insurer. The
underlying question as to the substantive or procedural nature of such
claim has, however, been litigated in other jurisdictions."
The Uniform Commercial Code
At this time, only a brief survey of the conflicts law contained in
the newly enacted Uniform Commercial Code will be attempted., Section 671.1-105 of the Florida Statutes provides:
14. Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 259 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1958).
15. Id. at 422.
16. Id. at 424.
17. Id. at 424.
18. E.g., Posner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. 111.
1965); Oltarsh v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965); See Notes in
39 VA. L. Rv.655 (1953), and 74 HARv. L. R,.357 (1960).
Failure to object to the lack of allegation as well as proof of foreign law may not be
raised on appeal, Corporad6n Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviaci6n Comercial v. Boy, 180
So.2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
19. For a discussion of previous versions of the Code as well as some of the basic
problems, see Rheinstein, Conflict of Law in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CoNmTMP. PROB. 114 (1951). Recently Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform CommerciaJ Code, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 364 (1963); Burton, The Uniform Commercial Code & Conflict
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Territorialapplicationof the code; parties' power to choose the
applicable law.

(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also
to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this code applies
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this code specifies
the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods (§ 672.2-402).
Applicability of the chapter on bank deposits and collections
(§ 674.4-102).
Bulk transfers subject to the chapter on bulk transfers (§ 676.6102).
Applicability of the chapter on investment securities (§ 678.8106).
Policy and scope of the chapter on secured transactions
(§§ 679.9-102 and 679.9-103).
The section caption indicates that with respect to transactions
regulated by the Code, i.e., sales, commercial papers, bank deposits
and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts,
bills of lading and other documents of title, as well as investment securities and secured transactions, including sales of accounts, contract
rights and chattel papers, the applicable conflict rules shall be identified
by either of two contacts: territory or parties' choice of applicable
law. However, the body of the section contains no express provision
substantiating the proclaimed territorial applicability of the Code. Instead, the Code adopted the flexible, abstract contact, termed alternatively
as "reasonable relation," or as "appropriate relation" which may or
may not include territorial factors. Moreover, under the same rule, set
forth in section 671.1-105, the territorial contact, if any, is only a
secondary method of determining the applicable law since the Code provides that it will only apply to "transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state" if parties did not take advantage of their "power to
choose applicable law."
Considering first that part of section 671.1-105 which permits the
parties to choose by agreement the law that shall govern their rights and
obligations, the first question concerns the types of transactions which
of Laws, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 458 (1960); and CAVERS, THE CHOICF-or-lAw PROCESS 233
(1965). For an analysis of problems involved see Bayitch, The Connecting Agreement: A
Study in Comparative Conflict Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 293 (1953). For a recent opinion see Ideal

Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Develop. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ala., 1966).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

may be subjected to the law so chosen (lex voluntatis). Even though the
Code uses rather broad language in referring to a transaction, nevertheless,
in view of the limitations inherent in the substantive coverage of the Code,
making it applicable only to enumerated and defined types of transactions,
it would appear that the power granted to the parties by the Code to choose
the law applicable to their dealings will only be as extensive as the Code's
substantive provisions. In addition it appears that if the transaction is to
be governed by a legal system which the parties have chosen by agreement,
it must first "bear a reasonable relation to this state." It is this relationship
with Florida that brings the Code authorization into operation. In turn,
the Code only gives effect to such choice of controlling law within the limitations imposed by the same Code. Once these requirement has been met,
parties may choose to apply the law of Florida or that of any other
"state or nation," provided the transaction bears a "reasonable relation
• . .to another state or nation."
Paragraph (2) of section 671.1-105, Florida Statutes, establishes
a further limitation on the parties' choice of the applicable legal system,
by providing that in five enumerated situations the parties' choice of
law will be effective only "to the extent permitted by the law [including
the conflict of laws rules] so specified." This limitation opens a difficult
question as to whether or not it aims only at matters of conflicts law
contained in the respective sections, or whether it is directed also to
substantive law referred to by the Code's conflict rules, i.e. regardless
of the parties' choice of applicable law. 20 From the express inclusion
of the phrase "conflict of laws," it is possibly suggested that only the
conflict aspects of the situation must be considered. Under this view,
it would follow that the conflict rules provided in the Code for these
five situations take precedence over the parties' power to choose the
applicable law. These conflict rules, then, as well as conflict rules of the
legal system identified by them as controlling, will determine the effects
of the lex voluntatis in regard to the specially enumerated transactions.
The other alternative is to extend the effect of paragraph (2) to
the substantive law identified by the conflict rules of the Code. This
would create a set of substantive law rules (the otherwise applicable
law) which would, depending upon their cogent or non-cogent nature,
give or deny effect to the substantive rules of that legal system which
the parties' agreement had sought to establish as controlling of their
transaction.
Postponing a full discussion of the specifically enumerated exceptions
for later, a few peremptory remarks nevertheless seem in order. The
first exception deals with the provision that the fraudulent nature of
a retention by the seller of goods sold is to be determined by the "law
20. For a discussion of this notion see Bayitch, op. cit. supra note 19, at 298.
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of the state where the goods are situated."'" In interpreting this provision, it should be remembered that this particular conflict rule applies
only to the characterization of the seller's retention as fraudulent, but that
no particular conflict rule is provided in the Code for the substantive contents of the section. Strict interpretation of paragraph (2) of section
671.1-105 would, therefore, prevent the parties from agreeing upon
another legal system to determine the allegedly fraudulent nature of
the retention. Such an interpretation seems highly impractical and
suggests no reason for including the conflicts law of the situs of the
property. However, if this provision is interpreted as including the substantive provision favoring the rights of the seller's creditors against
goods sold, then the otherwise applicable law would prevent the choice
by parties of a legal system which grants fewer rights to one of them
than does the Code. An alternative result would apply if the substantive
rules of paragraph (2), section 671.1-105, are considered to be cogent,
and as such not amenable to elimination or change by parties' agreement, or, as in the present case, by selecting a legal system with different
substantive rules from those provided by the Code.
The second exception limits parties' choice of the applicable law in
matters regarding the "liability of a bank for action or non-action with
respect to any item handled by it for purposes of presentment, payment or collection." Since such liability is governed, under an express
provision of the Code, "by the law of the place where the bank is located
[or its] branch or separate office," 22 difficulties in interpretation parallel
those indicated in relation to the first exception.
The third exception applies to bulk sales. Except in regard to transfers listed in a following section,2" "all bulk transfers of goods located
within this state are subject to this chapter." 24 Since this is a unilateral
conflict rule, i.e., one that only governs the conflict applicability of the
substantive law of the Code without providing a rule for the possible
application of another legal system, the inclusion of the conflict of laws
rules provided in section 671.1-105 amounts to a meaningless reference
to the conflict rules of the same Code.
The fourth exception deals with the "validity of a security and the
rights and duties of the issuer with respect to registration of transfer,"2 "
which are governed by the law "of the jurisdiction of organization of
the issuer." The section not only unnecessarily repeats the inclusion of
conflict of laws rules, but also leaves the meaning of the term "jurisdiction of organization of the issuer" far from clear.
21. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-402 (1965).
22. FLA. STAT. § 674.4-102 (1965).

23. FLA. STAT. § 676.6-103 (1965).
24. FLA. STAT. § 676.6-102 (1965).
25. FLA. STAT. § 678.8-106 (1965).
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Finally, the fifth exception applies to secured transactions.26 Insofar
as the latter section applies expressly to assets located within Florida,
the reference to the conflicts rules again makes no sense. A further
consideration of the latter section demands a special discussion, particularly in view of the fact that Flordia has, at the same time, enacted a
statute dealing with foreign-created interests in motor cars and given it
"precedence over any provisions of this code which may be inconsistent
27
or in conflict therewith.1
"Failing such agreement this code applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state. ' 28 What such appropriate relation is,
whether it means something different from a "reasonable relation,"
or whether a number of contacts will support either relation is left to
the courts to decide.
It should be noted that references in the Code to the controlling legal
system include a reference to its conflict rules as well. This may amount
to an acceptance of the doctrine of renvoi. Whether or not the acceptance
of the renvoi principle includes only what is termed a reference back
or also a reference forward, i.e., to a third legal system, has yet to be
decided.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS

Jurisdiction2 9

was recently re-defined as the "power conferred on
a court by the sovereign to take cognizance of the subject matter of a
litigation and the parties brought before it and to hear and determine
the issues and render judgment."8 It is obtained "by service of process
or voluntary submission in order that a person may be heard,"'" and is
not "dependent upon the correctness of the decision rendered."82 One
of the methods of submission in advance is that effectuated by executing
a cognovit note. Confronted by an Ohio judgment entered on the basis
of a cognovit note executed by the defendant, a Florida court recently
denied 8 the judgment full faith and credit on the ground that the place
of its execution or delivery did not appear in the note and, further,
because the reference contained therein to "any Court of Record in
the United States" was "to general in [its] nature and void for uncertainty" under Ohio law. 4 The Florida court apparently preferred to
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.9-102, 679.9-103 (1965).
27. FA. STAT. § 680.10-104(2) (1965).
28. FLA. STAT. § 671.1-105(1) (1965).
29. For a recent discussion of the international aspects of jurisdictions, see Mann, The
Doctrine of Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, 111 REcuzm DES Coups 9 (Hague 1964). For a

discussion of service and notice requirements, see Executive Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 223
F. Supp. 1011 (D. Ariz. 1963).
30. Dyer v. Battle, 168 So.2d 175, 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
31. Id. at 176.
32. Ibid.
33. Henry Bierce Co. v. Hunt, 170 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
34. Id. at 100.
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decide the question by relying on the law of the state rendering the
judgment, rather than by speculating on the extra-territorial effect
claimed by the applicable Florida statute."5
A. Acting within Jurisdiction
Long-arm statutes have expanded jurisdictional powers of the states
far beyond traditional territorial limits, provided, of course, that they
meet the constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court as
to the required minimum contacts with the respective jurisdiction. In
Florida, all such statutes not only define, more or less precisely, the
particular activity involved, they also require the cause of action to
have arisen out of such activities within the state, and further, that in
addition to constructive service on designated state officials, reasonable
notice, as prescribed in the statute, be given to a defendant.
1.

NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS

To perfect jurisdiction in accordance with section 47.29, Florida
Statutes, the notice of constructive service must be forwarded by the
Secretary of State 6 "forthwith." When such notice to defendant was
delayed for thirty-four days, the court held the notice to be ineffective.8 7
The question of whether or not a claim has arisen from an "accident or
collision within the State" was litigated in Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v.
8 In this
Miller."
action, between the insured and his insurer, based on an
arbitration award concerning damages arising out of an automobile accident in Florida between the insured and a third party, the court held,
unusual as it may seem, not only that the claim arose out of an accident,
but that the dispute between the instant parties also arose out of the
accident. Consequently, constructive service under section 47.29, Florida
Statutes, was proper. It is obvious, however, that the claim between the
parties did not arise from the accident, but out of the contract with the
insurance company; and the company was not "involved" in the accident.
It is clear, therefore, that the action was not one "against such operator
or owner... entitled to control of such motor vehicle," as required by the
statute.8 9
35. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1965).
36. Cf., Cases Against Non-Resident Operators of Motor Vehicles, vol. I Report of the
Secretary of State of Florida 291 (1959-1960).
37. Paradis v. Cicero, 167 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
38. 172 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
39. Service in case of concealment, Steedman v. Polero, 181 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965). A Georgia resident at the time of the accident who later became a resident of
Florida was not amenable to Georgia jurisdiction under its non-resident motorist statute
(GA. LAWS 1937, as amended in 1957, GA. CODE ANN. § 68-808). The contrary ruling of
the lower court was held to be in violation of the Georgia Const. art. I, § I, ff III as well
as of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. Noted in 39 TuL. L. REv.
342 (1965). Jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements:
A Plea for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1964).
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NONRESIDENT AIRCRAFT AND WATERCRAFT OPERATORS

The statute, 40 enacted in 1959, applicable to nonresident operators of
watercraft was expanded in 1965 to include operators of aircraft with
no other change in the language of the statute. Consequently, nonresidents, operating, navigating or maintaining an aircraft in the state, will
be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as their agent for
service of process in any action against them "growing out of any accident
or collision in which such nonresident . ..may be involved while
operating, navigating or maintaining an aircraft.., inthe state."
3.

BUSINESS OR BUSINESS VENTURE BY NONRESIDENTS

A further basis for long-arm jurisdiction is contained in Florida
Statute, section 47.16. It provides for constructive service of process upon
the Secretary of State, and notice to the defendant at his last known
address, in any action brought against a nonresident who operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture, or has "an
office or agency" within the state, provided the cause of action arose "out
of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to such business or business venture.""' As the number of cases increases, the underlying rules become clearer. In a general sense, a few rules stand out,
among them the one requiring that the statutory jurisdictional grant be
strictly construed since it is in derogation of the common law.4"
In the absence of a challenge to the constitutionality of a long-arm
statute, discussion of the trial court's jurisdiction in terms of due process
"minimum contacts" standards is improper4 since long-arm statutes may,
and generally do, require more than the bare constitutional minimum. For
this reason, the court's solution to the jurisdictional issue in Simari v.
Illinois CentralR.R. Co.44 was unsatisfactory. On the plaintiff's appeal in
an action against an Illinois corporate defendant, to recover for personal
injuries sustained in Missouri, the district court of appeal considered two
40. FLA. STAT. § 47.162 (1965).

41. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965). On jurisdiction of small claims courts over nonresidents,
see FLA. ATT'Y Gas. REP. 357 (1963-1964).

42. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, 176 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1965); Underman v.
Brown, 169 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Florida Inv. Enterprises v. Kentucky Co., 160
So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). For a liberal construction where defendant corporations
are involved, Giannini Controls Corp. v. Eubanks, 181 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) (concurring opinion). Foreign corporation which has not been engaged in business in Florida
since the enactment of § 47.16 FLA. STAT. is not amenable to jurisdiction in an action filed

subsequently to such enactment, Heberle v. P.R.O. Liquidating Co., 186 So.2d 280 (Fla. Ist
Dist. 1966); accord Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So.2d 481 (Miss. 1966); but see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d
187 (8th Cir. 1965).
43. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. McDaniel, 172 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Teeby Realty
Corp. v. Gasway Corp., 181 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Lake Erie Chem. Co. v. Stinson,
181 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
44. 179 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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questions: (1) "whether such service comports with the due process requirement of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,"
and (2) "if that service does so comport, whether the said service complies with the requirements of the statutory provisions in Florida . .. .,"
In discussing the first question the court completely disregarded the
Florida statutory provisions which confer jurisdiction over foreign corporations only under clearly defined conditions. These conditions are statutory, that is, set out in section 47.16, Florida Statutes, and do not arise
by virtue of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. As has
been frequently noted,4 6 a jurisdictional statute may, and the Florida
statute does, require more than the constitutional minimum. After all, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution is not a jurisdictional grant; it merely establishes the outer limit to
which a local jurisdictional statute may go, without replacing the jurisdictional grant contained therein. If within such .limits, the local jurisdictional statute will survive an attack on constitutional grounds.4 T Nevertheless, the appellate court delved into the abstract question of whether-or
not contacts existing in the case met the minimum standards under the
due process clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court. It is submitted
that in so doing, the court missed the point, particularly since the Florida
jurisdictional statute neither requires "doing business," nor "presence",
nor "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" nor that the
defendant "must have certain 'minimum contacts' with it."4 Equally
unacceptable is the court's implied reliance on three factors "having to do
with the [defendant company's] activities in Florida related to the cause
of action,"" namely that plaintiff purchased her ticket in Florida, that the
45. Id. at 222.
46. Survey I, at 278.
47. In a particular case, however, there may be a positive local rule interpreting the
statutory jurisdictional grant to be co-extensive with the minimum constitutional requirement under the due process clause. For example, this is the case in California where the
statutory requirement of "doing business in this state" is "synonymous with the power
of the state to subject foreign corporations to local process," Henry R. Jahn & Son v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 2d 855, 858, 323 P.2d 437, 439 (1958) ; Mechanical Contractors
Ass'n v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 342 F.2d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1965). However, for
Pennsylvania, the court in Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 246 F. Supp. 261, 262 (W.D. Pa.
1965) observed that the local statute relating to service of process on non-resident corporations "had not gone to the limit permitted by federal due process."
48. This unwarranted shift from the express statutory jurisdictional grant to the constitutional minimum standards under the due process clause is clearly visible in Teeby Realty
Corp. v. Gasway Corp., 181 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), looking for "sufficient contacts
within the State . . . to subject defendant corporation to substituted service of process";
in Lake Erie Chem. Co. v. Stinson, 181 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) relying on the "scholarly opinion . . . in Simari v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. . . .", and in Harris v. Bean, 182 So.2d
464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) where the court found that defendant "had sufficient contacts with
the transactions out of which this cause arose to meet the 'minimum contacts' rule."
49. Supra note 41. The use of the center-of-gravity method for jurisdictional purposes
was expressly rejected in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where the Supreme Court
remarked that Florida did not "acquire jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the
controversy. . . . The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Id. at 254. Again
in Rosenblatt v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1 (1965) the Supreme Court declincd tq
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trip commenced in Florida, and that [defendant] maintains in Florida
two permanent offices to solicit passengers and freight for interstate trips.
This approach to the question of the court's jurisdiction is, of course,
immaterial where an existing statute expressly delineates the terms and
conditions pursuant to which judicial jurisdiction may attach.
The only questions properly before the court were, first, whether or
not the alleged activities of defendant constituted what the statute clearly
defined as to "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state, or to have an office or agency in the state." 0
The answer to this question cannot be avoided either by a discussion of
possible constitutional limitations or by application of the procedural
center-of-gravity method, expressly rejected in Hanson v. Denckla.5 ' The
other question involved the jurisdictional effect of solicitation. Whether
or not mere solicitation satisfies the requirements of the jurisdictional
statute still remains a matter for judicial determination. The statute does,
however, expressly provide that merely having an office within the state
constitutes a sufficient contact with the state to render a nonresident
defendant amenable to constructive service of process, a possibility not
even noticed by the court. Finally, the court chose to completely disregard
the other statutory jurisdictional prerequisite, namely that the action
arises "out of any transaction or operation connected with, or incidental
to such business or business venture."5 2 Whether or not the plaintiff's
accident in Missouri arose from the fact that the defendant was engaged
in a business or business venture in Florida, as evidenced either by his
solicitation of business, or by the maintenance of an office here, is a
matter of statutory interpretation, to be determined in the light of the
facts of the. particular case. Again, whether either statutory prerequisite
to the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, as construed
by the court, satisfied minimal constitutional due process requirements is
a separate question that does not appear to have been presented to the
court. 5
apply the center of gravity test to an alleged conspiracy in Italy in determining whether
the New York court acquired jurisdiction to hear and determine -the cause arising from the
alleged conspiracy. It held "These facts . . . (are] not relevant, however, to the jurisdiction
of New York . . ." (Emphasis added.). Cf., Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F.
Supp. 1 (W.D. Va., 1965).
50. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965).
51. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
52. Supra note 50.

53. Compare the rationale of the court in this case with the identical reasoning-so far as
minimal constitutional due process requirements are concerned-of the United States Supreme
Court in Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In the Hanson case, the Court discussed
Florida's in personam jurisdiction on the basis of the constitutionally required contacts
enunciated in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) and in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and failed to find such contacts
in the circumstances of this case. Among other things, the Court found that the defendant
lacked an office in Florida and transacted no business there, contacts expressly provided
by FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965) as sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Florida courts
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It is now well established that the operative facts (contacts), required by the jurisdictional statute must be considered on a case-by-case
basis.5 4 The burden of proving those facts necessary to call the nonresident business statute into operation rests with the plaintiff, who must
substantiate the jurisdictional allegations of his complaint by "affidavit
containing statements of fact, or by other proof."55
Again on the interstate level, the district court of appeal, in Steel
Joist Institute, Inc. v. J. H. Mann III, Inc.,5" agreed with the court
below by holding that a foreign corporate nonprofit trade association,
which periodically inspected in Florida joists manufactured by its members, was engaged in business there. Similarly, a nonresident defendant
who executed a motel lease in Florida was found to be engaged in a business venture, and a subsequent action for an alleged breach of the lease
was held to have resulted from such business venture; the court observed
that "[T]he instant motel business would not be in existence had not
[the defendant] executed the lease."5 7
When the defendant is a corporation, additional difficulties may
arise.5 8 For example, a claim may be directed both against the nonresident
corporation and against its nonresident officers personally. In Odell v.
Signer,5 9 the plaintiffs, in an action to re-establish and to recover upon a
promissory note signed by the individual defendants and a nonresident
foreign corporation (of which the individual defendants were officers),
took an interlocutory appeal from an order dismissing the complaint as to
the individual defendants for lack of jurisdiction over them. The note on
in litigation arising out of, or incidental to, the defendant's Florida operations. On the contrary, the Court in Hanson found that "The cause of action . . . is not one that arises out
of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum state [Florida]." (Id. at 251).
54. Giannini Controls Corp. v. Eubanks, 181 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); James v.
Kush, 157 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
55. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, 176 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1965). A self-serving
affidavit that the foreign corporation had surrendered its permit to do business in Florida,
together with a certificate of withdrawal and a letter from the Secretary of State was held
not to constitute sufficient evidence, thus invalidating the service of process in a suit filed
one week after withdrawal certificate had been fied, Zucad Realty Corp. v. Sonz, 179 So.2d
114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
56. 171 So.2d 625 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
57. Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So.2d 733, 740 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964).
58. Service on a Florida corporation which had failed to designate an office for service
of process, Radiation, Inc. v. Magnetic Systems Corp., 173 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
In Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1965) an injured seaman's action was
brought under the Jones Act in the federal district court in Florida. Defendant's motion
to transfer on ground that venue was not properly laid in Florida was denied, the appellate
court holding that such venue is proper in any district where the carrier is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business. The restrictive provision of the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C.A. 688, providing that "jurisdiction . . . shall be under the court of the district
in which defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located" is to be
interpreted in the light of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1949), defining venue in actions against
corporations as proper in "any judicial district in which it . . . is doing business."
59. 169 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

which the present suit was based had been executed previously by the
individual and corporate defendants in settlement of prior litigation
between the same parties, arising out of the corporation's activities in
Florida; it had been signed by the defendant-officers in their individual
capacity as well as on behalf of the corporation. In the first suit, the individual defendants had been personally served with process, while in the
instant suit service upon all of the defendants was pursuant to the provisions of Florida Statutes, section 47.16 (1965). In support of the order
granting their motion to dismiss, the individual defendants contended,
inter alia, that the execution of the note and the defense of the lawsuit
were not sufficient acts, in and of themselves, to constitute carrying on or
engaging in a business or business venture within the meaning of the
statute; they further argued that all of the acts performed by them in
Florida were done as agent, officers, or employees of the corporation, and
were not attributable to them individually. Although the district court of
appeal agreed that the activities of the individual defendants in Florida
were insufficient to amount to engaging in business or a business venture,
it nevertheless reversed the order of dismissal entered by the trial court
for its supposed lack of jurisdiction over the individual defendants, since
in the particular circumstances presented by this case, the corporate acts
should have been imputed to the individual defendants for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction over them. The circumstances included the fact
that the note had been executed in settlement of litigation in which the
defendants had been served personally. "By settling the litigation, and
then refusing to honor the note given in settlement, these individuals are
defeating the jurisdiction over them initially obtained."6 The court said
that it could not condone such conduct. Further, the individual officers, as
agents of the corporation, would be personally liable to third persons injured by their tortious activity, notwithstanding that these acts were performed within the scope of their employment as corporate officers. "If the
tortious corporate activity is attributable to them personally, then the acts
of that corporation which constitute it as doing business in this state, are
similarly attributable to the individuals for purposes of determining
jurisdiction."'" The case contains a dissenting opinion by Judge Horton,
who objected to the broad interpretation of the "doing business" statute
on the ground that "statutes such as these are required to be strictly con);62
strued and cautiously applied ....
The jurisdictional significance of the alleged presence in the state of
a resident agent of a foreign corporation was discussed in Lake Erie
Chem. Co. v. Stinson.63 The court not only held that the mere allegation
that the foreign corporation had a resident agent in Florida did not
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Ibid.
162 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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amount to an allegation that the defendant was engaged in business in the
state, such allegation also precluded service of process on the Secretary of
State by virtue of the last sentence of paragraph (1), section 47.16,
6 4

Florida Statutes.

On the international level, the court in Lake v. Lucayan Beach Hotel
held that mere solicitation of business in Florida by a Bahamian
hotel corporation was not sufficient to meet requirements of section 47.16.
Yet, the court found that the statutory requirements had been satisfied
from the fact that the defendant corporation "maintained an apartment
in Miami Beach where it entertained travel agents for the purpose of
producing business through their office ...[and] an office in Palm Beach,
Florida, to which general business correspondence could be addressed and
would be answered."6 6 However, the question whether or not the damages
claimed for an alleged breach of an employment contract arose from such
activities was not raised. In Inter-Ocean Commerce Corp. v. Heller"' the
garnishees-appellees, Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, moved to dismiss
Co.65

64. For cases involving the jurisdiction of the federal courts over non-resident foreign
(Florida) corporations in diversity actions, see South Carolina, Martin v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, 242 F. Supp. 533 (W.D.S.C. 1965), and Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc.,
233 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Jurisdiction over a Florida corporation in Sansone v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 164 So.2d 151 (La. 1st Cir. 1964). In Personam Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts over Foreign Corporations in Diversity: State v. Federal Law
under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 327 (1964); Personal Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations in Diversity Actions: A Tilt-yard for the Knights of Erie, 31
U. Cm. L. REv. 752 (1964); Diversity Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over Foreign
Corporations,49 IowA L. REv. 1224 (1964); Civil Procedure: Service of Process on the
Foreign Corporation,18 U. FLA. L. REV. 145 (1965).
In Punta Gorda Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Green Manor Constr. Co., 166 So2d
889 (Fla. 1964), reversing 159 So.2d 255 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), the Florida Supreme Court
held that the trial court had properly entered a default judgment against a foreign corporate
defendant constructively served with process pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16 and 47.30
and failing to file a motion or responsive pleading, even though there was pending at the
time of the entry of the default an undisposed of motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the foreign corporate defendant. Service of process was originally
made upon one H. Greer as the alleged agent of the corporation. The defendant denied
that Greer was its agent and moved to dismiss the complaint. Apparently, the plaintiff
conceded the insufficiency of the service of process upon the defendant because it thereafter served the defendant constructively. Subsequently, the default was entered. On
the defendant's appeal, the court of appeal had held that the trial court had erroneously
entered the default while there was pending an undisposed motion in the case. The supreme
court disagreed. Where an undisposed motion is pending in a cause, a default judgment
may not be entered unless the determination of the motion either way would not affect
the plaintiff's right to proceed with the actions. When jurisdiction of the defendant was
obtained by substituted service, determination of the pending motion could in no way
affect the court's jurisdiction or the right of the plaintiff to proceed with the cause. The
defendant filed no motion or responsive pleading after the substituted service was effected.
The rule gives everyone his day in court. At the same time, it is likely to serve
the salutory purposes of conserving the time of trial courts by making it unnecessary for them to rule on motions that present no valid issue, and of preventing
delay occasioned by the filing of such motions ...
(Id. at 891).
65. 172 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
66. Id. at 261.
67. 161 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction. In their affidavit they denied
that they were engaged in any business in Florida and added that the
garnishment was based "upon an alleged contract which was not entered
into or negotiated in the State of Florida.""8 Relying on Forston v.
Atlantic Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., 9 the court held that "plaintiff has made a
sufficient showing that the garnishees have engaged in a business venture
in Florida" and, therefore, that they were amenable to jurisdiction. However, it is not clear whether the cause of action arose from alleged activities in Florida, which were found to exist on the basis of two contradictory
affidavits, a finding possibly unnecessary under section 624.022, Florida
Statutes.7 °
In a number of cases, Florida courts found alleged activities to be
insufficient to meet statutory requirements. In G & M Restaurants Corp.
v. Tropical Music Serv. Inc.,71 for example, the mere fact that plaintiff
billed the defendant Georgia corporation for services performed by a
Florida corporation in accordance with the instructions of the latter was
held insufficient to establish "doing business" in Florida on the part of
defendant, particularly since no relationship of agency, or ratification on
the part of defendant corporation was shown.
Substantial difficulties arise from paragraph (2), added to section
41.16, Florida Statutes, in 1957. This subsection provides:
(2) Any person, firm or corporation which through
brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors sells, consigns, or
leases, by any means whatsoever, tangible or intangible personal property, to any person, firm or corporation in this state,
shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business or business venture in this
state.
In the words of a federal court "The Florida arm is not only long. It is
strong and its sinews were strengthened by the legislative reflex to court
decisions . . . and the muscles have been beefed up by the legislative

declaration of policy stated in emphatic terms:" 7 2 business located in
other jurisdictions directly or indirectly furnishes millions of dollars
worth of tangible and intangible personal property to the people of
Florida; the cost of litigating both tort and contract actions arising from
these transactions is prohibitive and frequently results in "denying all
rights and remedies regarding such purchase, lease, consignment, use or
consumption." The policy of the legislature as expressed in the statute is
68. Id. at 27.
69. 143 So.2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).

70. Confederation of Can. Life Ins. v. Vega y Arminan, 135 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961), cert. denied, 144 So.2d 805 (1962) ; Survey I, at 287.
71. 161 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
72. Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135, 137 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964).
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to afford Florida users a convenient forum in which to judicially determine their disputes. Nevertheless, constitutional standards of due process
require additional workable criteria for the interpretation of statutory
language in the light of the stated legislative intent.
These problems were brought into sharp focus in an action upon a
Florida default judgment brought in a federal court in Texas.7 3 There,
the defendant, a Kansas manufacturing corporation, denied that its activities in Florida put it within the reach of section 47.16(2). It argued that
a default judgment obtained thereby was not entitled to full faith and
credit. The trial judge, in a lengthy and carefully written opinion, held
that service upon the vice-president of defendant's Florida distributor was
insufficient; the appellate court reversed.7 4 Relying on Fawcett Publications Inc. v. Rand7 and Deere & Co. v. Watts,7" the appellate court applied the criterion of "some degree" of control by the defendant, both over
the personal property involved in the situations listed in paragraph (2) of
section 47.16, as well as over the "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors selling or distributing the personal property in this state." It found
the "evidence overwhelming" to meet the required degree of control. In
regard to the contested service of process on the vice-president of this
distributor, the appellate court noted, that the process was not served on
the Secretary of State, but rather on the local distributor through its vicepresident, as the resident agent, according to the last sentence of paragraph (1) of section 47.16. Although the court admitted that the
defendant corporation and its Florida distributor "did not stand in the
traditional relationship of principal and agent," it held, nevertheless, that
their close economic business ties were sufficient to satisfy the Florida
standard that there be "a legal or moral duty on the part of the [agent]
to report and properly handle a summons served on him as agent. .... ,M
A more limited aspect of the statutory provision under discussion was
involved in the prolonged litigation of Young Spring & Wire Corp. v.
Smith,7 81 which finally terminated in the supreme court's holding that, in
the terms of Fawcett Publications,Inc. v. Brown, 9 the plaintiff's affidavit
"lacks any material fact which would clearly show that [defendant] is
doing business in Florida," since it only stated that the latter informed the
73. Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.
Tex. 1963).
74. 332 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1964).-Cf., Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp.
393 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
75. 144 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
76. 148 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).

77. This criterion was enunciated in Mason v. Mason Prod. Co., 67 So.2d 762, 763
(Fla. 1953).
78. Various stages of the litigation have previously been reported at 168 So.2d 540 (Fla.
1964), 169 So.2d 846 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), and 172 So.2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), in
addition to the opinion in 176 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1965).
79. 146 So.2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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inquiring plaintiff as to its "nearest distributor," which was a Florida
corporation with a Miami address. However, the supreme court found
itself unable "to ascribe any significance to this. The use of the word
'distributor' in the context employed is insufficient to establish the fact
that this 'distributor' is controlled by [defendant] or that [defendant]
has even a modicum of control over its products while in the possession of
the 'distributor.' "80 In a similar vein, lack of control over the product
involved, or over the wholesalers who handled the product after its sale in
New York and shipment f.o.b. to warehouses outside of Florida, supported a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in Cooke-Waite Labs.
Inc. v. Napier."'
4.

UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS

The controlling statute8 2 which extends the state's jurisdictional
powers far beyond those claimed under other long-arm statutes has not
yet been judicially interpreted in these sensitive areas.
5.

NONRESIDENT

CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Charitable organizations which have their "principal place of business without the State, or are organized under and by virtue of the laws
of a foreign state" and "solicit contributions from people in this State"
are not only subject to the provisions of this Act, but also "shall be
deemed to have irrevocably appointed the Secretary of State" as their
agent for service of process in "any action or proceeding brought under
the provisions of this Act," i.e. Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act,
1965.83
6.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

Whomsoever shall be issued letters of administration of a decedent's
estate must, among others, designate "some resident of the county as his
agent or attorney for the service of process." This designation shall be
80. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, 176 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 1965). The question
of the sufficiency of "control over the personal property in the hands of the brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers, or distributors," also was involved in DiGiovanni v. Gittelson, 181 So.2d
195 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), the court finding that the corporate co-defendant "did exercise

control over the drug which it sold to [defendant] and which was subsequently administered
to plaintiff."
81. 166 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
82. FLA. SrAT. § 626.0505 (1965) ; Slrvey I, at 288. Service on the vice president of the

insurance company instead of the commissioner of insurance was held insufficient in Morris
v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d 906 (3d Dist. 1966) on the ground that the latter
is the sole method. Service of the writ of garnishment, United States v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1966).
83. FLA. STAT. § 496.12 (1965).
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taken to constitute the consent of the person so designating that service
of any process upon the designated agent or attorney shall be sufficient
to bind the person so designating in any suit or action against such personal representative, either in his representative capacity or personally;
provided that such personal action must have accrued in the administration of such estate. 4 This rule applies to any personal representative,
whether a resident or a nonresident of Florida, but not to corporate
fiduciaries.
7. PROPERTY
Florida has not adopted a statute subjecting nonresident owners of
property situated in the state, to local jurisdiction in suits related to such
property. However, an exception exists with respect to the ownership of
aircraft and watercraft,85 the mere "maintaining" of which in the state
may subject nonresidents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts, provided,
of course, that the action is "growing out of any accident or collision in
which such nonresident ...may be involved while, either in person or

through others . ..maintaining an aircraft, boat, ship, barge, or other
watercraft in the state.
,86 Itappears that the mere "maintenance" of
these chattels is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the nonresident
owners. Of course, it is possible that ownership of other assets in Florida
may amount to engaging in business or a business venture, provided these
assets are operated as such. However, the mere fact that a defendant
owned land in Florida and maintained it in compliance with municipal
ordinances did not constitute a business venture in Florida. This was true
even though a defendant had rented his property for one year with an
option to purchase, where the venture terminated at the expiration of the
option. The tenants vacated the premises, and the broker terminated his
relationship with the defendant before the occurrence of the alleged injury
to the child on the premises owned by the nonresident."7 The court also
added that the injury which had allegedly been caused by a dead tree did
not arise out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental
to any business venture on the part of defendant.8 8 Similarly, in Unterman
v. Brown"9 the court held that the co-ownership of a restaurant in Florida
by defendant did not make the defendant amenable to the jurisdiction of
the Florida courts, since it was not shown that the action arose out of any
transaction connected with that restaurant.
84. FLA. STAT. § 732.45(2) (1965).
85. FLA. STAT. § 47.162 (1965).
86. Ibid.
87. James v. Kush, 157 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
88. Ibid.
89. 169 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Florida has no single-act tort statute like, for
example, New York. The constitutionality of such statute was recently upheld in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid, 86 Sup. Ct. (1965).
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Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction

In Payton v. Swanson ° two pertinent rules were re-stated. After
the plaintiff in an in personam action against a nonresident defendant
had perfected jurisdiction by garnishing defendant's bank account in
the state, the defendant urged dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on
two grounds: (1) that there had been no personal service on defendant;
and (2) that a nonresident plaintiff is not entitled to sue quasi-in-rem.
Both attacks were unsuccessful on the grounds, first, that "service of
process on a nonresident ...

defendant is not required to gain quasi-in-

rem jurisdiction over his property within the state by way of garnishment," and, second, because Florida prescribes no limitation based on
residence of the plaintiff in regard to his right to bring a garnishment
procedure.
C. In Rem Jurisdiction
In Department of Ins. of the State of Ind. v. Highway Ins. Co.,9

the defendant Department had moved, unsuccessfully, for dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction over defendant in an in rem action pertaining to
title to Florida land. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion
on the ground that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter,
i.e., land, and that service of process had been made as provided by
statute' upon the defendant as the liquidator of the Indiana insurance
company.
D. Litispendency
In A. I. Armstrong Co. v. Romanach3 the court re-stated some of

the fundamental rules in the matter of pendency. As a general rule the
pendency of an action in another state involving the same subject matter
is not "ground for abatement of a subsequent action in Florida."94 However, the court has the power to "stay a proceeding until the determination of a prior pending suit,"9 based on considerations of "comity to
the courts of other jurisdictions, the prevention of multiplicity of suits,
as well as the prevention of unnecessary vexation and harassment of the
defendant . . . by unnecessary litigation."96 Sometimes, the effect of

litispendency is determined by statute. In Springer v. Colburn,97 the provision of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act,98 to the effect that "during
the pendency of delinquency proceedings in this or any reciprocal state, no
action or proceeding in the nature of attachment, garnishment or execu90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

175 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
170 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
FLA. STAT. §§ 48.01, 48.02 (1965).
165 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
Id. at 818.

95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 819.
97. 162 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1964).
98. FLA. STAT. § 631.201 (1965).
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tion shall be commenced or maintained in the courts of this state against
the delinquent insurer or its assets," was held to operate only prospectively.
E. Federal Law
Within the area of federal law, some developments of local interest
are worthy of mention. For example, the venue provisions of section 1391
of title 28 of the United States Code have been expanded by the addition
of the following provision:
(f) A civil action on a tort claim arising out of manufacture,
assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance, use, or operation of
an automobile may be brought in the judicial district wherein
the act or omission complained of occurred. 99
With respect to litigation with international aspects, both titles 18 and
28 of the United States Code have been amended. The former extends
the applicability of- federal criminal law to perjuries committed before
any tribunal, officer, or person authorized under federal law to administer an oath either here or abroad, 100 a rule that had already been
adopted by the courts. 01' The latter title has been improved by detailed
provisions relating to service in both foreign and international litigation, 10 2 assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before them,"° as well as to subpoenas in foreign countries and
to contempt. 4 Similar improvements may also be noted in the 1965
amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."0 5 The amended
rules now contain provisions as to the persons before whom depositions
may be taken in foreign countries.'0 It may also be noted that the
recently approved Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act
has been enacted in Arkansas 1

7

and Oklahoma.1 08

The same subjects have been discussed by the Tenth Hague Conference on Private International Law (1964). At this Conference, a draft
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters was signed by the representatives of the United States.
99. 48 U.S.C. 491 (1964).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964).
101. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd, under Rocha
v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961); noted in 15 U. MzAai L. REV. 428 (1961);
United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1949).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1787 (1949).
104. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784 (1949). Smit, International Litigation under the United

States Code, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 1015 (1965).
105. 178 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965).

106. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.23(b).
107. ARK. STAT. § 27-2501-7 (1963). Cf., Roberts v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 183
So.2d 811 (Miss. 1966).
108. OKLA. STAT. § 1701.01 (1965 Supp.).
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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

On the interstate level, the enforcement of the judicial decision
of a sister state is resisted, in most cases, either by asserting noncompliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the adjudicating forum
or by attacking their constitutional validity." 9 In a recent case, the lack
of jurisdiction was asserted by alleging the erroneous application of the
adjudicating forum's substantive law. A Florida court had entered a
decree expressly granting a divorced wife the right to receive alimony
payments beyond the husband's lifetime. In a subsequent suit, brought
in West Virginia, to enforce the Florida decree, it was argued that the
entry of the decree was erroneous under the applicable substantive law
of Florida, that it constituted a judicial act beyond the court's jurisdiction and, consequently, was not entitled to full faith and credit in West
Virginia. The West Virginia Supreme Court agreed.'
The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and certified four questions of
law to the Florida supreme court." The latter court answered the first
and second questions"12 to the effect that a decree of alimony to a divorced
wife so as to bind her husband's estate was not in accordance with
Florida substantive law, but that the entry of such a decree does not
render the court without "subject matter jurisdiction." It would appear
that certification was unnecessary in view of the generally accepted rule
that erroneous application of substantive law by a court, which had
otherwise properly perfected jurisdiction in regard to the parties and the
subject matter, does not result in lack of jurisdiction. The argument that
erroneous application of the substantive law deprives a court of jurisdiction appears to be based on the naive assumption that courts act within
the scope of their jurisdiction only when properly applying the controlling
substantive law. The absence of such interdependency between jurisdictional and substantive law was clearly established in Justice Holme's
opinion in Fauntleroy v. Lumre. in which he observed that substantive
law relates to the duty of the court, while jurisdictional law relates to its
power. "Under the common law it is the duty of the court of general
jurisdiction not to enter a judgment upon a parole promise made without
consideration; but it has power to do it, and, if it does, the judgment is
unimpeachable, unless reversed."" 4 In the instant case, the decision of
the trial court, granting alimony, was rendered by a court having jurisdiction both over the parties and over the subject matter and became
final without appeal. In a brief per curiam opinion," 5 the Supreme Court
109. Seidelson, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: An Instrument for Resolution of
IntranationalConflicts Problems, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.554 (1964).
110. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385 (W.V. 1962).
111. 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
112. 163 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1964).
113. 210 U.S. 230 (1908),
114. Id. at 235.
115. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963).

1966]

CONFLICTS

reversed the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court on the ground
that the decision was "based on a misapprehension regarding the law of
the sister State," and added that the "Florida decree must be treated as
if if were perfectly correct under the substantive principles of Florida
law." On the constitutional issue, the Court declined to adopt the position
that a rule of law imposing a burden on the estate of a divorced man
who has had his day in court violated due process.
Among the cases involving the question of full faith and credit by
Florida courts to the judgment of sister states, the following deserve
mention. The failure of a Michigan court to comply with its rules,
regarding constructive service by publication in a foreclosure suit brought
in that state, was held to be grounds for denying full faith and credit to its
judgment ordering the sale of Michigan land and the payment of a
deficiency."' However, in State v. Taran,"I a Minnesota judgment for
delinquent taxes was held entitled to full faith and credit in Florida, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was served in Minnesota when
he returned there for a criminal trial. Under Minnesota law, immunity
is not granted in such situations. In regard to a contrary rule in force
in Florida, the court remarked that "Lightweight contrary policies in one
state will not counterbalance the top-heavy compulsion of the full faith
and credit clause of the federal constitution to observe and enforce the
judgments of another state."'1 8
The effect of the Florida statute of limitations in an action on a
sister state judgment was litigated in Markham v. Gottsegen."9 Against
assignee's attempt to recover on a twenty-one-year-old Ohio judgment,
two points were raised on appeal. First, the defendant argued that the
statute of limitations of the forum barred the action, while the plaintiff
insisted that the judgment had been kept alive in Ohio by filing it at fiveyear intervals according to the provisions of the applicable Ohio law. In
this respect, the Florida court held that the effect, if any, of such filing
was limited, according to the Ohio statute, to the judgment's remaining a
"lien ... upon the lands and tenements situated" in the respective Ohio

county and that any reliance on Ohio law, according to section 92.031
of Florida Statutes, is not automatic, but depends upon proper pleading
by the interested party. Even if proven, the court observed, the Ohio
116. Henock v. Yeamans, 340 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1965). A Florida judgment against an
incompetent for accumulated arrears for child support was denied full faith and credit in
New York because of the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the incompetent, as
required by Florida law, In re Raffa, 24 A.2d 494, 261 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1965).
117. 164 So.2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
118. Id. at 894. In Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1965), the supreme court
held that neither comity nor full faith and credit requires that New York disbarment result
in disbarment in Florida. But a California decree adjudging paternity is final and, consequently, entitled to full faith and credit in Florida, Mocher v. Rasmussen-Taxdal, 180
So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
119. 179 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

statute would not change the result; such revival would be invalid and
the bar of the statute of limitations of the Florida forum would not be
removed, where "the defendant has not been served with process, had
not voluntarily appeared, and had previously removed from the state
where the proceedings were had."' 120 The plaintiff's second contention,
that the cognovit note contained a waiver, thereby dispensing with the
necessity for service or notice, was dismissed by the court on the ground
that "the waiver of service of process and notice applied to confession of
a judgment; thereupon all error was released and all right of appeal, and
nothing else."''
A New York judgment recovered against a partnership, of which the
defendant was a member, was denied effect by a federal court sitting in
Florida,'22 on the ground that "a judgment -against a partnership is not
binding upon a partner in his individual capacity where rendered in an
action without service upon him."' 2 8
The degree of acceptance given by sister states to Florida judicial
decisions was illustrated by several cases. In Dunn v. Royal Bros. Co.,
Inc.,"24
' a Georgia court found that the Florida court had properly applied
nonresident
motorist statute 12 and held that the statute complied with
the
the constitutional requirement as to the notice. The court quoted from
Wuchter v. Pizzutti 2 that such statute "must, in order to be valid,
contain a provision making it reasonably probable that notice of service
on the Secretary of State will be communicated to the nonresident
defendant who is sued." Similarly, in Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v.
Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 12 7 already discussed, a federal court of appeals28
carefully checked the underlying Florida nonresident business statute
and, in regard to its constitutionality, remarked that "Any lurking due
process problems are . . .narrowly confined to the question of whether
the Florida statutory structure reasonably assures that the nonresident
will have fair notice and opportunity for a fair defense."'2 9 In so "assaying
the federal constitutionality of the Florida statute," the court also looked
at Florida procedure and found that it affords a nonresident defendant
"a full and unconditional opportunity to contest jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant to the bitter end."'8 0 Even though Rule 1.11(b)
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, copied from Federal Rule 12 (b),
has abolished the distinction between general and special appearances,
120. Id. at 102.
121. Ibid.
122. Olsen v. Puntervold, 338 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1964).
123. Id. at 22; cf., Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965).
124. 111 Ga. App. 322, 141 S.E.2d 546 (1965).
125. FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1965).
126. 276 U.S. 13, 18 (1928).
127. 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1964).
128. FLA. STAT. § 47.16(2) (1965).
129. Supra note 127, at 141.
130. Id. at 144.
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it nevertheless reserves, for the defendant, the right to object to jurisdiction"3 ' and thus guarantees him a "full, unrestricted opportunity to
have the Florida court pass upon its own statute and the sufficiency of the
facts to support either amenability or method of service, with right of
review to the United States Supreme Court thereafter as to any federal
constitutional questions."'3 2 On the other hand, upon the authority of
88 a New Jersey court" 4
Fall v. Eastin,"
denied full faith and credit to
that part of a Florida divorce decree which ordered a husband to convey
to his wife land situated in New Jersey, but granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff as to that part of the Florida decree which dealt with
personal property in New Jersey.' The effect, in terms of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, of a previous default decree for separate maintenance recovered in Florida by a wife upon the husband's subsequent
divorce action brought in Nevada was in issue in Clark v. Clark.' The
Nevada court held that the husband's action for divorce on the alleged
ground of his wife's extreme cruelty was not barred because the Florida
default decree was obtained on the basis of husband's extreme cruelty.
The wife's reliance upon the Florida rule relating to compulsory counterclaims was considered unfounded since the rule is one merely of local
procedure and without extra-territorial significance. 3 7 The dismissal of an
action on a Florida default judgment, brought in a federal court in
Virginia, was upheld on appeal 8 ' on the ground that, according to the
findings of the trial court, the defendant had never been served nor was
he present in Florida at the time of the original action, regardless of the
return of service in Florida. The appellate court held that these findings
were not clearly erroneous. Finally, in Succession of King 9 a Louisiana
court of appeal held that a Florida divorce decree, incorporating an
agreement between spouses under which the husband would pay a weekly
alimony to his wife until her death or remarriage, whichever event occurs
first, not final since Florida retained under section 65.15 of Florida
Statutes jurisdiction to modify the decree and, consequently, was not
entitled to full faith and credit. The dissenting judge forcefully indicated
the fatal deficiencies of the majority opinion.
131. Elly Lilly & Co. v. Shields, 83 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1955).
132. Supra note 127, at 144.

133. 215 U.S. 2 (1909) and Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (1894)
affirming 51 N.J. Eq. 444, 27 Atl. 435 (1893).

134. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 84 N.J. Super. 232, 201 A.2d 581 (1964), rev'd,
35 U.S.L. WEEK 2095 (1966).
135. But see McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1962), noted 9 U.C.L.A.L.
Rzv. 489 (1962).
136. 389 P.2d 69 (Nev. 1964).
137. Id. at 73. Attack on a Florida default judgment, Caperson v. Vander, 116 So.2d
653 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 120 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1960), was unsuccessful in New York,

in spite of the defendant's contention that Florida court's determination of jurisdiction had
been "made on discretionary grounds," Vander v. Caperson, 187 N.E.2d 109, 236 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1962).

138. Freehill v. Benn, 348 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1965).
139. 184 So.2d 583 (1966). Cf., Levantin v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 83 So.2d
581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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The question of the effect to be given Florida court adjudications in a
federal court was at issue in In re Constructors of Florida,Inc.140 Without
introducing the full faith and credit aspect of the question, the federal
court relied on a number of federal cases and upon general legal principles
in determining the res judicata effect of equitable decrees in Florida."'
International conflicts situations involved, of course, the inescapable
Mexican divorce decrees 4 2 which will be discussed elsewhere in this
study. Other reported Florida cases deal with judgments recovered in
Canada and in Bolivia. In the former case 4 the lower court's summary
judgment on a Canadian money judgment was reversed on the ground
that the motion for summary judgment was not supported by competent
proof of the authenticity of the foreign judgment' 4 4 since the copy of the
judgment was not authenticated in any way except by the affidavit of a
defendant's officer.' 45 A Bolivian administrative confiscation decree was
held valid in Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters.'40 The Underwriters insured
certain cargo under two policies, the first excepting confiscation, and the
second excluding "dispatch of any consignment ...

contrary to the laws

of the country in which goods are situate or through which transit will
take place." The court below found Bolivian customs authorities to have
confiscated the insured goods as contraband and the decision of the
customs authorities affirmed by the National Council of Customs. The
appellate court concluded that "the court [below] recognized Bolivia
as a sovereign government with a civilized jurisprudence and laws
regulating its custom matters, and gives full effect to the findings and
conclusions in their order,"' 47 adding that plaintiffs "made no sufficient
showing below to overcome the presumption of the validity of the foreign
adjudication."' 4
An agreement to arbitrate between a Florida corporation and a
citizen of North Carolina was allegedly breached and the corporation
brought an action for damages in a federal court in North Carolina.
After denying the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act 149 to the
present agreement, the court held that the arbitration agreement, as well
140. 349 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1965).

141. Res Judicata in the Federal Courts: Application of Federal or State Law: Possible
Differences Between the Two, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 96 (1965).
142. Mexican Divorces: A Survey, 33 FoRm.Am L. REV. 449 (1965); BAYrrcH &
SIQuEiRos, AmERICAN-MEXICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966). Attorney's fees in a
suit attacking Mexican divorce, Pollack v. Pollack, 184 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1966).
143. Jackson v. Stelco Employee's Credit Union, Ltd., 178 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
144. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.6(c); FLA. STAT. § 92.032 (1965).
145. Cf., Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964).
146. 174 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
147. Id. at 72.
148. Id. at 73. In the same way, the court in Corporaci6n Peruana de Aeropuertos y
Aviaci6n v. Boy (180 So.2d 503, 505, Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) stated that "The presumption in
law [is] that an act taken by a government agency, even the agency of a foreign government,
is according to law and regular in every respect."
149. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1947).
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as claims arising out of it, were governed by the law of North Carolina
where the agreement was made and where the work for which arbitration
was intended had to be performed. Since the Uniform Arbitration Act
of North Carolina applied, according to judicial interpretation, only to
existing controversies, thereby making such arbitration agreements enforceable, all other arbitration agreements, including the one in the
instant case, to arbitrate future controversies, remained unenforceable.51 °
IV.

ERIE-KLAXON DOCTRINE

The scope of the Erie doctrine' 5' is still in need of clarification. In
some instances the Supreme Court has shown a marked reluctance to
intervene while in others it tackled questions with opinionated zeal. The
question of sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict remained
undecided in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co." 2 and again in Theriot v.
Mercer,15 3 in both cases on the ground that evidence was sufficient under
either standard that might be appropriate, state or federal. In other cases,
clear-cut rulings have emerged. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,"' for example,
which involved tort actions arising out of the 1960 crash of a Northeast
airliner over Boston Harbor, the defendants sought certiorari to review
a writ of mandamus, granted on the plaintiffs' petition by the circuit
court of appeals, staying an order transferring certain of the actions from
a federal district court in Pennsylvania, where they had been instituted
originally by the personal representatives of the decedents' estates, to the
federal district court in Massachusetts, where the majority of actions
arising out of the crash were then pending. The defendants had moved in
the trial court for transfer pursuant to the provisions of section 1404(a)
of the Judiciary Act,'5 5 which allows a change of venue "[f]or the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . .
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." In
granting the writ, the court of appeals sustained the plaintiffs' contention
that the action might not have been brought originally in the Massachusetts district court, since they had qualified as personal representatives
of the decedents' estates in Pennsylvania but not in Massachusetts, and,
under Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 ' the plaintiffs'
capacity to sue would be determined by the law of the state in which
150. McDonough Constr. Co. v. Hanner, 232 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N. 1964).
151. FRIENDLY, IN PRAISE OF ERIE AND TnE NEW FEDERAL COMMON LAW (1964);
Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228 (1964);
Carpenter, Pluralistic Legislative Jurisdiction: Plaintiff's Choice under the Klaxon Rule,
40 IND. L.J. 477 (1965); Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal
Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 732 (1963).
152. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
153. 262 F.2d 754 (1959); cert. denied, 359 U.S. 983 (1959); rehearing denied, 360 U.S.
914 (1959).
154. 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Choice of Law After Transfer of Venue, 75 YALE L.J. 90
(1965).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1949). (Emphasis added.)
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
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the district court sat. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that since
both venue and jurisdiction were proper in the district of Massachusetts,
the proposed transferee forum, "the effect of the Rule [17(b)], like the
existence of different state laws in the transferee forum, is not relevant
to a determination of where, as indicated by federal venue laws, the
action 'might have been brought.' "' "[T]he 'might-have-been-brought'
language of section 1404(a) plainly refers to the similar wording in the
related federal [venue] statutes and not directly to the laws of the state
'
of the transferee forum."158
To hold otherwise ".

. would grant personal

representatives bringing wrongful death actions the power unilaterally to
reduce the number of permissible federal forums simply by refraining
from qualifying as representatives in States other than the one in which
they wished to litigate. .

.

.The power to defeat a transfer to the con-

venient federal forum should derive from rights and privileges conferred
by federal law and not from the deliberate conduct of a party favoring
trial in an inconvenient forum."1 9 The effect of Rule 17(b) should be
considered by a district court in connection with the determination of
whether a requested transfer is "in the interest of justice." The Court
then held that the motion for a change of venue from Pennsylvania to
Massachusetts could not be defeated on the ground that there would
be a prejudicial change in the controlling law since, under the ErieKlaxon doctrine, the district court sitting in Massachusetts would be
required to apply the law identified by the conflict rule of the new
forum state because "[T] he transferee district court must be obligated to
apply the state law that would have been applied if there had been no
change in venue."' 6 Similarly, Rule 17(b) should be so construed that
the phrase "in which the district court is held" refers "to the district
court which sits in the state that will generally be the source of applicable
laws."'' It supported its position by reiterating the fundamental policy
underlying Erie, namely, to maintain "the critical identity .. .between

the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the
State in which the action was filed."'6 2 Therefore, a change of federal
venue "generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of
courtrooms."' 63
The sufficiency of the service of process in a diversity action was the
crucial issue in Hanna v. Plumer."' There, the Court was confronted
with the problem of whether to apply Massachusetts law requiring service
"in hand," or to apply the federal rules, which permit substituted service
by leaving the summons at a defendant's residence. Relying on the "broad
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

376 U.S., at 618.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 624.
Id.at 639.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 639.
Ibid.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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command" of Erie v. Tompkins, the Court started from the simple rule
that in diversity cases federal courts are to "apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law." However, the court concluded that subsequent cases have shown that "Erie-type problems were not to be solved
by reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure
distinctions."1 65 Rather, the policies underlying the Erie rule should be
considered. On this basis, the Court considered the applicability of the
outcome-determinative test but declined to apply it, not only because
"every procedural variation is outcome-determinative,"' 66 but also
because the difference between the two rules would be of "scant, if any,
relevance to the choice of the forum"' 6 and the prevention of forumshopping was one of the policies underlying the Erie decision. Finally,
the Court concluded that since the Erie doctrine in no way invalidates
a federal rule of procedure, "To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing
state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's
grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise
that power in the Enabling Act."' 68 In the Hanna case, as in a few prior
decisions,' 69 the pendulum appears to swing away from the preponderance
of state law and towards the controlling applicability of federal law.
Following the dictates of Erie,7 ° federal courts in Florida resort to
Florida conflict rules and, whenever so indicated, to Florida substantive
law. In accordance with the accepted rule that the burden of proof is
governed by state law, Florida substantive law regarding the construction
of group insurance policies was applied in Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
v. Breslin.17 ' In an action by a bakery corporation against a can company
for breach of implied warranty, 72 the court applied the Florida rule that
a manufacturer's limitation upon his liability is valid against the ultimate
consumer. Similarly, Florida substantive law was held to govern the
liability of the manufacturer of a printing press to an employee of a
publishing company for damages caused by the malfunction of a press
sold to the company.7 7 Florida substantive law was also used to deter7
mine the liability of a municipal corporation for its police officers;' 1
and the validity of a contract. 17 In the latter case the court observed that
165. Id. at 465.
166. Id. at 468.
167. Id. at 469.
168. Id. at 473.
169. E.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Monarch
Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
170. Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 Tax. L.
Rav. 1 (1964) ; Diversity Jurisdiction:A Symposium, 40 IND. L.J. 511 (1965).
171. 332 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1964).
172. American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965).
173. Vander Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965).
174. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965).
175. Talco Capital Corp. v. Canaveral Int'l Corp., 225 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1964),
aff'd, 344 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1965).
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"since Florida was the situs of the contracts on both the loan and the
guarantee involved in the case, the applicable law in determining contractual validity in this diversity case normally would be the law of
Florida,"'7 notwithstanding the fact that a federal statute and regulation
were involved, because Florida law was found to be not inconsistent with
cases dealing with such federal law. In Gauck v. Meleski, 7 7 involving
damages arising from a rear-end collision, the federal court followed the
Florida rule that violation of traffic law is not always negligence per se;
and in Ross v. Stanley, 7 8 involving a stockholders' derivative action, the
Florida statute of limitations was applied against a claim for an equitable
accounting in which the plaintiffs sought to recover for alleged damages
and unjust enrichment which allegedly arose from the breach of a fiduciary relationship. In deciding the question of whether a materialman's
claim against the surety in a public contractor's bond was a liability
created by statute, and subject to the three year limitation, or to the
twenty year limitation as being contractual, the appellate court did its
best "utilizing all the currents which indicate the way the Erie .

.

. wind

blows" but found that even dicta "blow both ways." After analyzing the
pertinent Florida statute and "With the Erie currents being so weak
and diverse," the court relied on its own analysis and held the claim to be
statutory, adding that "If in the face of these contradictory expressions
we have incorrectly divined the Florida law, it must be remembered that
the choice of the forum,
federal or state, was the articulate initial decision
79
of the Creditor."

In other cases, federal courts sitting outside of Florida applied
Florida law, as required by the conflicts rules of the forum state. A
federal court, sitting in Tennessee and applying the conflict law of that
state, determined the liability of an automobile insurer arising from an
accident in Tennessee according to Florida law as the lex loci contractus. 80 In Pallen v. Allied Van Lines,' 8' a federal court applied
the general New York rule that the res judicata effect of a sister state
judgment is determined by the law of the state where the judgment was
rendered in the "absence of compelling circumstances requiring the
application of New York law," and decided the collateral estoppel effect
of a Florida judgment according to Florida law.
In some diversity litigation, federal courts turn to federal law. The
sufficiency of the evidence to raise a question for the jury was held to be
controlled by federal standards in Shirey v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co."s ' while substantive aspects of the plaintiff's case and of the defen176. 225 F. Supp., at 1014.
177. 346 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1965).
178. 346 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1965).
179. Delduca v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf.,
Lucom v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1965).
180. Carr v. American Universal Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1965).
181. 223 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
182. 327 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1964).

1966]

CONFLICTS

dant's defense remained matters to be decided by the law of the forum
state, i.e., Florida, including the Florida rules regarding contributory
negligence and the validity of distraction as a defense.
Outside the proper scope of Erie, a federal court may apply state
law interstitiously'8l in order to implement gaps in the controlling federal
law, for example, in regard to interest,"' or in order to determine statecreated rights."8 5
Increasing reliance on the doctrine of abstention by the federal
courts when confronted with the application of unsettled state law has
provoked serious objections to its proliferation. 6 In Florida, in particular, a statute provides for the certification of questions of state law to
the supreme court. Even though the binding effect, as well as the very
nature of these legal opinions, has been seriously questioned,8 7 there has
been no apparent reversal in the trend.
V.

CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES

A. Torts
The new wave eroding some areas of the time-honored lex loci
reported Florida
delicti has not yet reached Florida."'8 The few recently
89
cases still indicate adherence to the traditional rule.1
183. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
184. United States v. Smith Eng'r & Constr. Co., 240 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Fla. 1965);
Hartley & Parker v. Florida Beverage Corp., 348 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1965).
185. Peniiisula State Bank v. Thompson-Copeland, Inc., 346 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1965).
E.g., concerning the requirement of affirmative misrepresentation, Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965) ; Florida Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act,
FLA. STAT. § 524.03 (1965). See also Fleischer v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 329 F.2d 424
(5th Cir. 1964), concerning the abatement of corporate claims under FLA. STAT. § 608.29
(1965).
186. Louisiana Power & Light v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); United States Life Ins. Co.
v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); Meredith v.
City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
187. Heimbush, Doctrine of Abstention: Need of Reappraisal, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW.
101 (1964) ; Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Abstention, 1 DuxE L.J. 102 (1965);
Abstention: Election of Forum and Intersovereign Certification, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 895
(1964); Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: Perfection of Means and Confusion
of Goals, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964); Policy and Procedure in Abstention: Is the Pullman
Retention Technique Proper, 40 IND. L.J. 248 (1965); Kaplan, Certification of Questions
from Federal Appellate Courts to Florida Courts and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine,
16 U. MiAmi L. REv. 413 (1962).
188. For recent developments note: Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. 1965); Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750
(6th Cir. 1965); Ciprari v. Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
The question whether Florida would apply the limitation under the Illinois wrongful
death statute (lex loci delicti) in an action brought in Florida against the manufacturer
brought by the executrix of a Florida citizen, on the return leg of his flight from Chicago
to Tampa under a ticket bought in Florida, has been certified to the Florida supreme court,
Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 347 (5th cir. 1966).
189. E.g., Young v. Viruet de Garcia, 172 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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The interrelation between the local statute creating the claim and
the personal status of the persons claiming under that statute was involved
in Young v. Viruet de Garcia.9 ' The action was brought under the
Florida Wrongful Death Statute 1 ' which, as the lex loci delicti, would
govern the substantive rights of the parties; however, the status of the
claimants depended upon the existence vel non of a marriage and was to
be decided under the law of the jurisdiction "where the contract of
marriage takes place"' 92 while the status of the children, who had also
filed claims under the Wrongful Death Statute, was to be determined
by the law of their father's domicile. The determination of the status of a
married couple, who were driving in a car used by them as part of the
consideration for their services, was involved in the case of Raydel, Ltd. v.
Medcale.193 The wife had sued the corporate owner of the car on the
ground that it was vicariously liable for her husband's negligent driving.
In affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the appellate court held that the
trial judge did not err in allowing plaintiff, a married woman, to recover
for her own expenses. The appellate court sustained the lower trial court's
ruling that the responsibility of the plaintiff for her own medical bills was
governed by the law of her domicile, Quebec, under whose law she was
"primarily liable for these expenses."' 1 4 However, the supreme court
quashed the appellate decision without reaching the conflict aspects of the
5
case.

19

Turning next to the cases decided by courts outside of Florida, which
applied Florida tort law, a ;Louisiana case may be mentioned. Without
referring to a particular Louisiana conflict rule, the federal court dismissing as immaterial the distinction in the characterization of the
demand as tort or contract, found that the alleged acts were committed in
Florida and that "any breaches of trust or contract were based on contracts having as many, if not more, significant contacts with Florida than
any other state."9 The court observed that the only contact with
97
Louisiana was that of jurisdiction, and applied Florida substantive law.
Cases arising out of the Federal Tort Claims Act 9 8 bring into play
state conflict rules, in the word of the Supreme Court, interstitiously. In
an action for damages allegedly caused by government's delay in furnishing promised materials, the court denied recovery on the basis of an
190. 172 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
191. FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1965). Collister, Wrongful Death and the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 13 KAN. L. REV. 529 (1965).
192. Young v. Viruet de Garcia, supra note 190, at 244.
193. 162 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
194. Id. at 915.
195. Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 178 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1965).
196. Ruberoid Co. v. Roy, 240 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. La. 1965).
197. In Brewi v. Handrich, 256 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965), the New York court applied the
Babcock rule to an accident in Florida.
198. Cross, Federal Tort Claims Act and Conflict of Laws, 36 Miss. L.J. 1 (1964).
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express stipulation in the contract that the government did not warrant
or guarantee timely delivery, a clause valid under Florida law, 9' apparently considered as the locus solutionis. However, in a subsequent case,
the same court took the position that "claims based upon breach of
contract are wholly alien to the Tort Claims Act, °00 on the ground that
claims arising from contracts are governed by the Tucker Act 20 ' and
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims 20 2 regardless
of how plaintiffs characterized their claims, whether in contract or in tort.
In an action to recover damages for alleged malpractice by a government
physician practicing in a Georgia hospital, a federal court sitting in
Florida applied the law of the lex loci delicti, Georgia.20 3
A number of actions for compensation under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act20 4 (made applicable to employees
under the Defense Base Act) 205 have arisen from accidents on the islands
in the British West Indies. In determining the question of the scope of
employment, courts have taken a most liberal attitude in view of the fact
that plaintiffs are "far away from their families, in remote places where
there are severely restricted recreational and social activities." Therefore,
accidents related to these activities must
be considered as "incident to
' 20
the overseas employment relationship.
199. United States v. Croft-Mullins Elec. Co., 333 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1964).
200. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1965).
201. 24 STAT. 505, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1949).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1949).
203. Watson v. United States, 346 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1965), rehearing denied, 348 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1965).
204. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1927).
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1654 (1942).
206. O'Keeffe v. Pan Am. World Airways, 338 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1964), following Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. O'Hearne, 335 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1964).
In a split decision, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama court had jurisdiction
to award damages under Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act to an Alabama resident
injured within the scope of employment in Alabama for a Georgia corporation, regardless
of the holding in Green v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 161 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1947), to the
effect that a Mississippi state court has no jurisdiction to award damages under the Georgia
Act and that the federal court was subject to the same disability, and further holding that
the Georgia Act's remedy was "an exclusive one which can only" be afforded by the
Georgia Compensation Board. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965). Greenspan,
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.: Decline of Conceptualism in the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. PT. L.
Rav. 49 (1965). Nevertheless, on remand the federal appellate court declined to budge,
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 348 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1965).
Several Florida cases may be mentioned; e.g., Zacher v. Sun Elec. Corp., 4 Fla. Comp.
Rep. 241 (Indus. Comm'n 1960), held that Florida had no jurisdiction since both the
place of contract, as well as that of injury, were outside of the state; Smith v. Ohmlac
Paint & Ref. Co., Inc., 4 Fla. Comp. Rep. 296 (Indus. Comm'n 1960), cert. denied, 131
So.2d 204 (Fla. 1961), held that Florida had jurisdiction when an employee was killed in
Alabama, but the written employment contract was between the employee, a Florida
resident, and a New York corporation; Strickland v. Triangle Constr. Co., 4 Fla. Comp.
Rep. 380 (Indus. Comm'n 1961), Florida had no jurisdiction when the claimant was laid
off, but later rehired for work in Alabama; Dewberry v. Leonard Bros. Transfer & Storage
Co., 4 Fla. Comp. Rep. 248 (Indus. Comm'n 1960), cert. denied, 131 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1961),
Florida had jurisdiction since the contract was entered into in Florida, even though the
injury occurred outside of the state.
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B. Contracts
No change in the traditional conflict rules is noticeable in the area of
contracts: the center-of-gravity doctrine adopted in Laurizen v. Larsen20 7
and in some states, remains limited, in Florida, to seamens' claims. The
new method, also termed "grouping of contacts," was strongly urged by
the appellant in Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Robinson,"8 but elicited
from the court of appeals only a qualified answer, namely that "if Florida
were to be held to have adopted the 'grouping of contacts' rule, the
Venezuelan law would also control," i.e., the same law as would under the
traditional rule of the lex loci actus. Of course, there will be considerable
change under the newly adopted Uniform Commercial Code.20 9
The choice-of-law issue was litigated in Sperry Rand Corp. v.
IndustrialSupply Corp.210 in regard to a claim for rescission and damages
for breach of implied warranty arising out of a sale of complex machinery.
The federal court first found that the previous lease agreement for the
machinery had a clause making New York law applicable. This clause
was not contained in the subsequent sale agreement; thus, the lex
voluntatis was eliminated and the court, following Erie-Klaxon, turned to
Florida law to find the applicable conflict rule. Although Florida courts2 '
had approved the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Scudder
v. Union Nat'l Bank,212 which dealt with contracts generally, nevertheless,
the court in the instant case declined to follow that decision on the ground
that implied warranty is an incident of sale arising "apart from and
independent of the nature of the transaction and the situation of the
parties."2 1 It characterized warranty as a contractual right, but closer to
sales than to "general rules applicable in contract situations."2 4 Since
the only Florida case in point215 contained no rule, and as the place of
executing the contract was also the place of performance, the court turned
to recent writings and to the Restatement, which give preference to the
law of the situs of the chattels involved in the transaction. In the opinion
of the court, these alternative solutions did not change the applicability of
207. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
208. 339 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1964).

209. It may be noted that retail installment sales, FLA. STAT. ch. 520 (1965), are governed
by unilateral conflicts rules, i.e., rules only determining the applicability of Florida law by
referring to sales "entered into in this state" (Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, FLA. STAT.
§ 520.02(5) (1965)); Retail Installments Sales Act, FLA. STAT. § 520.31(7) (1965), and
Installment Sales Act, FLA. STAT. § 520.51(2) (1965). These provisions "take precedence
over any provisions of this code [Uniform Commercial Code] which may be inconsistent or
in conflict therewith." FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104(2) (1965).
210. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
211. Castorri v. Milbrand, 118 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) ; Walling v. Christian &
Craft Grocery Co., 41 Fla. 479, 27 So. 46 (1899).
212. 91 U.S. 406 (1895).
213. 337 F.2d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1964).
214. Id. at 368.
215. Farris & Co. v. William Schluderberg & Co., 141 Fla. 462, 193 So. 429 (1940),
rehearing denied, 142 Fla. 765, 196 So. 184 (1940).
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Florida substantive law since any of them, whether that of the situs, or of
the place of performance, or of the center of gravity, would lead to the
application of Florida law. While the trial court had decided the choice-oflaw issue in favor of New York law, the appellate court considered this to
be erroneous but, fortunately, added that it "does not, of course, follow
that its judgment was wrong." It may also be noted that the court held the
parol evidence rule to be substantive and, consequently, controlled by
Florida law.21
Conflict questions involved in usurious contracts were discussed in
Atlas Subsidiariesoj Florida,Inc. v. 0. & 0., Inc.21 In order to obtain a
loan, a married couple was required not only to execute a mortgage on
their Florida land but also to form a corporation which undertook to pay
interest in excess of twenty-five percent payable at the Pennsylvania
office of the defendant Florida corporation, Pennsylvania being the domicile of its parent corporation as well. The court found a flagrant violation
of Florida usury laws and ordered forfeiture of all sums payable, as well
as of interest, cancelled the mortgage and granted the plaintiffs restitution
of all sums paid under the usurious contract which the court branded as a
"sham contrivance and device.., so frequently ...used in this state as to
'
be an old acquaintance of those dealing in the lending arts."218
The
position of the defendants, that Pennsylvania law, as the lex loci solutionis, should control, and that the interest charged should be allowed,
was rejected by the court with the tart statement that the "father should
not be permitted to disavow his resemblance to the child by clothing him
with foreign garments." ' As a coup de grace, the court added that the
promissory note submitted in the suit "specifically provides that it is to be
construed according to the laws of Florida."2
Conflict problems involving employment contracts appear in two
" ' a federal court held that the employment
reported cases. In one 22
contract of a Florida-based pilot with the defendant Venezuelan air
carrier was controlled, according to Florida law, by the Venezuelan
labor code. Without citing any Florida authorities, the federal court
listed, in the fashion of the center-of-gravity method, nine contacts with
Venezuela, among them that the employer was a Venezuelan corporation,
that the contract was made in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan labor code
216. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1964).

An action arising out of the sale of drugs in Latin America was disposed of without resort
to conflict rules, Sanchez v. Crandon Wholesale Drug Co., 167 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964), quashed, 173 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1965).
217. 166 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
218. Id. at 461.
219. Ibid.
220. Ibid. Cf., Clarkson v. Finance Co. of America, 328 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1964); Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v. Standard Fin. Corp., 325 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1963); Rosencrantz
v. Union Contractors Ltd. &Thorton, 23 D.L.R.2d 473 (1960).
221. Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S. A. v. Robinson, 339 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1964).
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was embodied by reference into the employment contract, and that the
place of performance was between Miami and Venezuela, with some sidetrips in Venezuela. The other case dealt with double wage penalties
against a vessel for wrongful withholding of a seaman's wages.222 The
court held that in view of sections 544 and 596, 46 United States Code,
the statute granting this penalty does not apply to ships engaged in trade
between Miami, Florida, and Nassau or Providence in the Bahamas.
An insurance contract 22 was indirectly involved in litigation for
the payment of a trip policy. 22 4 While the substantive demand was decided
on facts found by the trial court, the denial of attorneys fees was affirmed
on the ground that
a resident of New York, who purchases a policy of insurance
from a New York company in that state pays all the premiums
there for a contract which does not contemplate any activities
by insurer or insured in Florida; and where the injury giving
rise to the loss did not happen in this state, is not entitled to
attorney's fees as a result of instituting the law suit in this
forum. To hold otherwise would encourage parties having no
connection with Florida to file suit on insurance policies in this
State in order to recover attorney
fees to which they would not
2 5
be entitled in their own state. 1
It should be noted that the recently added section 626.061 Florida
Statutes, 1965, prohibits the use of credit cards in the solicitation and
negotiation of insurance, as well as their use as a means of receiving or
transmitting premiums or "otherwise transacting insurance in this state,
or relative to a subject of insurance resident, located or to be performed
in this state." The only sanction seems to be that such activities will be
222. Watler v. M/V Sea Lane, 232 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
223. See generally, Unger, Life Insurance and the Conflict of Laws, 13 J. ComP. LEG. &
INT'L L. 482 (1964). A local policy holder's claim against a deposit made in Massachusetts
by a Florida insurance corporation was involved in the case of Commissioner of Ins. v.
Equity Gen. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 233, 191 N.E.2d 139 (1963).
For a full discussion of insurance contracts held by Cuban refugees under art. VIII (2) (b)
of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (60 STAT. 1401, 1944), see
Paradise, Cuban Refugee Insureds and the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, 18 U. FLA. L. Ra,. 29 (1965), and Bayitch, Florida and International
Legal Developments, 1s U. MiAmi L. REV. 321, 348 (1963); Bayitch, Conflicts of Laws in
Fla., 18 U. MImi L. Rav. 269, 275 (1963).
224. Home, Inc. v. Denning, 177 So.2d 348 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). The cash surrender
value of a policy in Cuban pesos payable in the United States is determined by the free
market value of pesos in the United States and not by the official rate established by a
Cuban decree, American National Ins. Co. v. de Cardenas, 181 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist.

1965), distinguishing Huntley v. Alejandre, 139 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). In Trujillo
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 22 Fla. Supp. 53 (Dade Cir. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 166 So.2d
473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), a petition for declaratory decree and for order to pay the cash
surrender value was denied on unusual grounds: one, that there is "no genuine issue of
any material fact" and that the issue is governed by the law of the Dominican Republic
as the place of performance of the insurance contract and, consequently(?), the proper
forum is that of the Dominican Republic.
225. Home Ins. Co. v. Denning, 177 So.2d 348, 350 (1965).
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considered "doing business in this state and shall be subject to the same
taxes" as insurers qualified to do business. In addition, persons engaged
in the prohibited activities will be held personally liable for such taxes.
Maritime transportation was litigated in CaterpillarAmericas Co. v.
S.S. Sea Road.226 In an action brought by a shipper against a vessel for
damages arising out of the alleged negligent unloading of a tractor with
parts in Nassau, Bahamas, the defendant successfully pleaded the
227
limitations of the Carriage by Sea Act.
C. Negotiable Instruments
Only one reported case appears to deal with negotiable instruments.
In an action upon a note payable in New York, but executed on a form
with the words "St. Petersburg, Florida," the defendant contended that
the note was usurious on its face under Florida law. The court held that
defendant must present facts to overcome the presumption that the
parties intended to have their
note governed by the laws of the state where
228
valid.
be
would
note
the
D. Property
1.

PEAL PROPERTY

In Colburn v. Highland Realty Co.,22 the district court of appeal
permitted a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell
Florida land against the foreign (Michigan) corporate vendor, notwithstanding the pendency in Michigan of delinquency proceedings against
the vendor, which was represented in the Florida suit by the Michigan
Insurance Commissioner in his capacity as the receiver of the corporation.
2.

MOVABLE PROPERTY

Vehicles of transportation: vessels,2"' railroad equipment,23 ' trucks
and motor cars,232 as well as aircraft, present complex conflict problems
because of their constantly changing situs and of the varied security
226. 231 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1964).

227. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1936). In regard to the liability of maritime carriers to
passengers, see Schwartz v. S.S. Nassau, 345 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965) ; on survival of action,
see Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), recently discussed in United Barge Co. v. Logan
Charter Serv., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624 (D. Minn. 1964) ; on the statute of limitations, see
Safir v. Compagnie Gdnirale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Sinclair,
Conflict of Laws Problems in Admiralty: The Passenger Ticket, 17 Sw. L.J. 521 (1963).
See also, Nassau Glass Co. v. Noel Roberts, Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Fla., 1965).
228. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Feldman, 42 Misc. 2d 839, 249 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1964);
Cf., Corporaci6n Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviaci6n v. Boy, 180 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1965).
229. 153 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
230. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 911-954 (1920).
231. Railway Equip. Act of 1952, 49 U.S.C. § 20(c) (1952).
232. Interstate Commerce Act as amended 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1958).
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arrangements. In many instances these problems are solved by federal,
as well as state, statutory enactments. Two recent enactments shall be
discussed here: one, a federally enacted conflict rule dealing with interests
in aircraft; and the other, a Florida enactment dealing with motor
vehicles.
The federal rule relating to aircraft was enacted as an amendment
to the Federal Aviation Act28 by adding a new section, 506, which reads:
Law governing validity of certain instruments. The validity of
any instrument the recording of which is provided for by section
503 of this Act shall be governed by the laws of the State,
District of Columbia, or territory or possession of the United
States in which such instrument is delivered, irrespective of the
location or the place of delivery of the property which is the
subject of such instrument. Where the place of intended delivery
of such instrument is specified therein, it shall constitute presumptive evidence that such instrument was delivered at the
place so specified.
It appears that the lex situs of the aircraft was rejected in favor of the
lex loci actus, i.e., that of the delivery of the instrument affecting interests
in aircraft. Some latitude was allowed for the lex voluntatis, i.e., the law
chosen by parties, by giving effect to the law of the place where the
2 4
delivery was intended according to the language of the instrument.
Before analyzing the 1965 Florida enactment dealing with interests
in motor cars, a few significant prior cases might be mentioned. The
practical question, regarding the rights of the purchaser of a car, for
value and without notice of lien against the holder of a security interest
properly recorded in another state, was clarified in City of Cars, Inc. v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp.235 The court started from the general
proposition that "motor vehicle liens valid in and registered under the
law of the state wherein such liens were created will be enforced in this
state ....,,236 For bona fide purchasers without knowledge of foreign liens

and for valuable consideration, protection was first sought in section
319.22(1), Florida Statutes, providing that no court of this state shall
recognize any right, title or claim to a motor vehicle unless evidenced by,
or on, a certificate of title issued in accordance with the provisions of that
act. Such defenses have been rejected on the ground that these provisions
"(were not intended to and do not 'cut off the rights of holders of liens
233. 49 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958).
234. In regard to the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in
4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1830 (Geneva 1948) the amendment expressly provides that
not take precedence over the Convention." The Convention was mentioned but
cussed, in Corporad6n Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviaci6n v. Boy, 180 So.2d 503
Dist. 1965).
235. 175 So.2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
236. Id. at 64.

Aircraft,
it "shall
not dis(Fla. 2d
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valid in and registered under the law of the state wherein such liens were
created,' and that such liens will be enforced in this state, under the
principles of comity, even as against subsequent purchasers or creditors in
this state, without notice. ' 2 7 The particular provision of section
319.27(3)(f) prescribes the kind of inquiry a purchaser must make to
protect himself against foreign-created interests and is construed as
applicable only to vehicles for which no title document has been issued
in Florida. In cases where title was issued in Florida, courts have
developed an exception to protect the innocent purchaser of a motor
vehicle in Florida against a properly recorded foreign lien in the vehicle,
where the purchaser has made a reasonable and diligent inquiry in the
state of prior registration in order to ascertain the existence vel non of
any liens. If an inquiry in the state of the prior registration of the motor
vehicle does not reveal the existence of any liens, Florida courts will deny
enforcement of such liens, notwithstanding the rule of comity. Applying
these rules to the case before it, the court recognized a foreign-created
interest in a car which was first registered in Ohio, where the security
interest also was created and properly registered, but which was subsequently registered in Alabama, and then in Florida. The purchaser
relied on the title certificate issued in Florida, but failed to make proper
and reasonable inquires in Alabama where the vehicle was registered
as a secondhand car which, in the opinion of the court, should have put
the purchaser on notice that "the vehicle was registered in another state
at the time the Alabama registration was sought and procured." ' Assuming that the application forms used in Alabama are similar to those
in use in Florida, the court reasoned, that the records would "have
revealed that at the time Alabama issued its certificate of registration, the
vehicle bore Ohio license plates." 3 Since the purchaser omitted to make
these precautionary inquiries, the court held that he had failed to protect
himself and was, therefore, in no position to eomplain.
Another action in replevin was brought by a mortgagee-bank against
a motor car dealer with whom the mortgagor has exchanged his car which
had been previously mortgaged in Missouri.2 40 The court declined to
enforce the Missouri-created lien on the ground that while the "nature,
validity and interpretation of contracts are governed by the laws of the
state or country where the contracts are made or to be performed, matters
of procedure and remedy in the enforcement of contracts depend upon the
forum or the place where suit is brought."'2 41 Taking also into consideration that to hold otherwise would put holders of contracts executed or to
237. Id. at 66, quoting from Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778
(Fla. 1954).
238. Id. at 69.
239. Ibid.
240. Fincher Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank & Trust Co., 166 So.2d 717 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
241. Id. at 719.
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be performed outside [of] the state of Florida in a preferential class to
that of holders of contracts executed or to be performed in Florida,242
the court held that the mortgagee had "an adequate remedy in equity to
foreclose its mortgage and can protect its security by appropriate means
' 243
in the equity court.
A comprehensive statute, enacted in 1965, dealing with interests in
motor vehicles appears as amended section 319.27 Florida Statutes, 1965.
In addition to rules regulating the notation of liens, mortgages and encumbrances on motor vehicles titled in Florida, the amendment also provides
for interests in motor vehicles "previously titled or registered outside of
this state upon which no certificate of title has been issued in this
state.1 244 Holders of interests in such motor vehicles "may use the
facilities of the office of the motor vehicle commissioner for the recording
of such lien as constructive notice of such lien to creditors and purchasers
of such motor vehicle in Florida, provided such lien holder files a sworn
notice of such lien in the office" 2 45 containing the information prescribed
in the statute. Whenever a Florida certificate is first issued on a motor
vehicle previously titled or registered outside of this state, the commissioner "shall note on the Florida certificate of title the following liens:
(1) any lien shown on the application for Florida certificate of title;
(2) any lien filed in the office of the motor vehicle commissioner in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection; and (3) any lien shown
on the existing certificate of title issued by another state. '2 46 After a
certificate has been issued in Florida on a motor vehicle "previously titled
or registered outside of this state, liens valid in and registered under the
law of the state wherein such liens were created are not valid in this state
unless filed and noted upon the certificate of title under the provisions of
'247
this section.
Additional conflict provisions generally applicable to security interests in chattels will come into force with the Uniform Commercial
Code.2 4' However, in relation to the statute summarized above, and other
provisions contained in chapter 319 Florida Statutes relating to title
certificates, the latter will "take precedence over any provisions of the
249
Code which may be inconsistent or in conflict therewith.1
3. ESCHEAT
25
In the wake of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth of Penn. 0
the state of Texas brought an original action in the Supreme Court against
242. Ibid.
243. Id. at 720.
244. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(a) (1965).
245. Ibid.
246. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(b) (1965).
247. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(c) (1965).
248. FLA. STAT. § 679.9-103 (1965).
249. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104 (1965).
250. 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Survey I, at 303.
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New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the Sun Oil Company, for the declaration
of its right to escheat personal property. 5 ' With Florida intervening in
the proceedings, the Court adopted the Florida rule that a debt is property
of the creditor, rather than of the debtor, and held that the power to
escheat is to be accorded to the state of creditor's last known address as
shown by debtor's records. Where there is no such record, or the creditor's
last known address is in a state which does not provide for escheat, the
state of the corporate domicile of the debtor may escheat such property,
subject to the right of the state of the last known address of the creditor
to recover it, if and when it should enact such a law.25 2
The handling of unclaimed funds held by personal representatives is
regulated by a 1965 amendment to section 723.221, Florida Statutes.
E. Family Law
1. MARRIAGE

The rule that the existence of a marriage is determined by the law of
the place "where the contract of marriage takes place" was applied in
Young v. Viruet de Garcia25 to an alleged marriage between two Puerto
Rican domiciliaries who lived together there, planned to perform a formal
marriage ceremony in Florida, but never did. Since the law of Puerto
Rico requires a formal marriage, and thus the intent alone to celebrate
such ceremony does not make such relationship a marriage in the legal
sense, the court held that there was no marriage either under Puerto
Rican or Florida law. The status of the children of such union, in an
action brought in Florida for the husband's wrongful death was to be
decided under the rule of the domicile of their father, in this case under
the laws of Puerto Rico.
2.

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

In spite of the human considerations in favor of the defendant's
second wife, however commendable they may have been, the court denied
255
254
the claim for alimony unconnected with divorce in Dawson v. Dawson
upon finding that the defendant's Mexican divorce from his first wife was
spurious. Distinguishing the Astor case,256 the court held that a suit under
251. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), noted in 18 U. FiA. L. REV. 154 (1965).
252. A Survey of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes, 9 ST. Louis L.
REV. 85 (1964); Sentell, Escheat, Unclaimed Property and the Supreme Court, 17 W. Rxs. L.
REV. 50 (1965).
Interests in a joint savings account are governed by the law of the place where the
deposit was made and the account kept, Helfritz v. Riegle, 24 Fla. Supp. 95 (1965).
253. 172 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
254. The 1965 legislature has amended FLA. STAT. § 65.09 and repealed FIA. STAT. § 65.10.
On tax aspects, see Leggett v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1965).
255. 164 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
256. 107 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958), cert. denied, 119 So.2d 793, reaff'd on rehearing,
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section 65.09, Florida Statutes, exists only by operation of the statute
and requires the existence of a valid marriage between the parties.
3.

DIVORCE JURISDICTION

Domicile of at least six months' duration is required for bringing a
divorce action in Florida."'7 This was questioned in a divorce action
between Cuban refugees residing in Florida in Perez v. Perez."' The
court held that "domicile of choice can be acquired on presence plus
' 259
intent to make one's home permanently or for an indefinite period.
Aliens may also acquire such domicile to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for divorce, regardless of their hope to return to their home country
"when the political situation which prompted [their] leaving is removed."26
When a nonresident wife, divorced ex parte by a Florida decree,
attempted to elect dower after the death of her former husband and the
election was disallowed, she brought an action against the executor of her
ex-husband's estate to set aside the divorce alleging, inter alia, her husband's lack of domicile in Florida at the time of divorce, as well as a
previous New York separate maintenance decree in her favor. 261' The
court denied the claim and rejected both grounds. It held that "by
choosing not to appear in the Florida divorce suit, the nonresident wife
was precluded from filing suit years later to set aside the decree for
matters which could have been litigated by her in defense of the divorce
suit"2 2 while the New York maintenance decree constituted no bar to a
subsequent divorce action.
120 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1959), Survey I, at 306, n.286. In State v. Kehoe, 179 So.2d 403 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965), the defendant's suggestion of prohibition in a suit for alimony unconnected
with divorce on the ground that, subsequent to the filing of the suit, he obtained a divorce
in Puerto Rico thus leaving plaintiff wife only the alternative of suing under § 65.04(8)
FLA. STAT.,--for which action she lacked the required six months local residence-was unsuccessful; the court held that the writ of prohibition is "available only to a party without
other adequate means of redress for the wrong about to be inflicted by an act of the inferior
court." In the instant case, however, the court below had "jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit," and the writ of prohibition will "not lie to review the correctness of an
order of the trial court overruling the challenge to its jurisdiction. Under the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, the appellate court continued, "a person who raises questions of jurisdiction
of his person is not prejudiced by participating in the trial and defending the matter on
the merits and [he] may obtain a review of the question of jurisdiction upon appeal."
(Id. at 405.)
257. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1965).
258. 164 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
259. Id. at 562.
260. Id. at 563.
261. Simons v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; see note 295 infra.
262. Id. at 210. Cf., Simmons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965),
discussed infra notes 286-288, and accompanying text. On constructive service Walton v.
Walton, 181 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), and Corrigan v. Corrigan, 184 So.2d 664
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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4.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

While the eighth statutory ground for a divorce in Florida.. was
discussed in the previous survey, 6 4 only the ninth ground 2 5 has been
litigated lately. It provides that if it shall appear that "either party had
a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage sought to be annulled,"
a divorce may be granted. In Burger v. Burger,216 both parties remarried
after obtaining a Mexican mail-order divorce. The court held this divorce
"totally invalid," the invalidity arising "out of a fraud perpetrated upon
them by a purported Mexican magistrate who, in fact, was totally without
authority and who conducted a divorce racket at the expense of innocent
victims. 2 17 In view of this fact, the supreme court found that the circuit
court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce on the basis of the ninth statutory
ground, and that it had the power to dispose of matters relating to the
custody and maintenance of children and property jointly owned.
The impact of a previous New Jersey decree for separate maintenance upon grounds for a divorce litigated in Florida was determined in
Hohweiler v. Hohweiler.268 The defendant urged both res judicata and
estoppel by judgment. Nevertheless, the court held that res judicata
requires the identity of the cause of action, which was lacking here since
the New Jersey proceeding was for separate maintenance, while the
instant Florida action was for divorce. In regard to estoppel by judgment,
the court admitted that the parties to the prior proceedings would be
prevented from re-litigating factual issues, even though the cause of
action in the second proceedings was different. However, this second
ground was also held insufficient because the defendant offered no proof
as to what factual issues had been actually litigated and decided in the
New Jersey suit, even though she submitted a copy of the New Jersey
decree.
5.

FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES

The effect in Florida of a divorce decree rendered in a sister state
was at issue in Grace v. Grace.269 The defendant attempted to challenge
the validity of an Alabama divorce decree obtained by the plaintiff wife
before she married defendant. In accordance with Florida law on collateral attacks, 7 ° the court held that defendant could not successfully
263. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(8) (1965).
264. Bayitch, Conflicts of Law in Florida, 1957-63, 18 U. Mvi,. L. REy. 269, 311
(1963).
265. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(9) (1965).
266. 166 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1964), quashing, 156 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
267. Id. at 434.
268. 167 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Cf. Harless v. Harless, 185 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1966).
269. 162 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
270. The district court relied upon the authority of Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507
(Fla. 1950) expressly rejecting the appellant's position that a collateral attack in Florida
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attack the Alabama divorce decree, not only because he had not been a
party to the proceedings, but also because "he had not shown . . . that
he occupied a status or had a right at the time of the entry of the Alabama
decree which was, or could be, affected thereby. A stranger to a decree
rendered by a foreign court may impeach such decree only when it is
attempted to be enforced against him so as to affect rights or interests
acquired by him prior to its rendition."2 7 '
As to the effect that Florida divorce decrees are given in other
jurisdictions, a few instances may be illustrative. Where the plaintiff,
in a subsequent declaratory judgment action, has sought to collaterally
attack a Florida ex parte divorce decree by alleging that she was still the
defendant's wife, the ex parte decree was sustained on grounds of estoppel.272 A Florida ex parte decree was also sustained against an allegation
that the plaintiff, a Florida domiciliary at the time of divorce, had failed
to apprise the divorce court of a prior New York separation decree.273
Where the wife has filed an answer in a Florida divorce proceedings, in
a subsequent action for divorce and alimony brought by her, she will be
estopped from litigating matters which she might have litigated in the
Florida proceedings.274
Mexican divorces appeared in two Florida cases already discussed.
In a third case, Kittel v. Kittel,275 the wife brought an action for a
declaratory judgment to deny validity to a Mexican divorce obtained by
her husband after she had been awarded separate maintenance by a
Florida court. The court took the position that in Florida a "declaratory
upon an Alabama divorce decree was governed by Alabama law on the ground that under
the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution Florida courts are without jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on an Alabama divorce decree and only Alabama
courts may entertain such an attack.
271. 162 So.2d 314, 318 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
272. Weiner v. Weiner, 18 App. Div. 2d 986, 238 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1963). In re Locke's Will,
21 App. Div. 2d 248, 250 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1964), held that a Florida divorce decree was not
open to collateral attack by a wife who had appeared in the Florida action through an
attorney. The order of a Florida court vacating a prior Florida divorce decree, on the
petition of the state's attorney general,-based on the fact that the divorce had been obtained
by a fraud upon the court since the wife was a domiciliary of New York, and not of
Florida, as required by statute, at the time she filed her complaint in Florida divorce proceedings-was held binding on the New York court in Williams v. Williams, 17 App. Div.
2d 958, 234 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1962).
273. Chenu v. Board of Trustees, 12 App. Div. 2d 422, 212 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1961).
274. Wood v. Wood, 174 Ohio St. 318, 189 N.E.2d 54 (1963). In an action in New York
for separation court dismissed action upon the ground that the parties are no longer married
by reason of a Florida divorce decree, regardless of a subsequent Florida decree made on
plaintiff wife's application, but without notice to husband, John v. John, 22 App. Div. 2d
804, 209 N.E.2d 289, 254 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1964), with two judges dissenting. Cf., Ragovis v.
Ragovis, 124 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1950). After two subsequent ex parte Florida divorces husband
was held liable for tax deficiencies arising from deductions to the first wife, Wondsel v.
C.I.R., 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), on the authority of Borax's Estate v. C.I.R., 349 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1965).
275. 164 So.2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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'276
decree may not be used to attack the validity of a judgment or decree,
but it allowed a direct attack when the "amended complaint alleged that
the same was void. 277

It should be noted that special conflict rules are contained in the
federal278 statute to determine the family status for social security pur-

poses.

6.

ALIMONY

Alimony claims arising out of foreign decrees will be enforced in
Florida courts on the basis of full faith and credit or of comity. Another
method is to establish the foreign decree as the decree of a Florida court
so that it may be "enforced by those remedies customary in the enforcement of our local decrees for alimony and support money. 2 77 However,
as indicated in Tischler v. Tischler:28 °
[T]here is no such cause of action known to our jurisprudence.
An action based on a foreign money judgment is an action of
debt or assumpsit and the foreign judgment is the basis or
ground for relief in the forum court, which relief, if granted, will
be our court's own money judgment according to our practice
and procedure. If the action is to recover alimony or support
money, grounded on a foreign decree, the final decree here should
be complete, since it is the local decree that is to be enforced.
The foreign decree has no extra-territorial effect, and to merely
adopt it by reference leaves the decree incomplete, and such
practice is disapproved.
In Mocher v. Rasmussen-Taxdal,281 another qualification, relating to
the right to future support, was grafted upon the effect of a foreign
alimony decree. The court recognized that past-due installments, final
under the law of the state where the decree was rendered, were entitled to
full faith and credit, and locally enforceable by equitable remedies, but it
nevertheless held that a foreign (California) decree granting alimony to
an illegitimate child may only be modified in Florida as to future support
payments after the decree whose modification is sought has been domesticated as a Florida decree. "Once established, the chancellor has jurisdic276. Id. at 834.
277. Id. at 835.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1961). Moots v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
349 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1965); Pace v. Celebrezze, 243 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. W. Va. 1965);
Starace v. Celebrezze, 233 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Rivera v. Celebrezze, 248 F.
Supp. 807 (D.P.R. 1966); Cupler v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 252 F. Supp.
178 (W.D. Pa. 1966). Recognition of divorce under Seminole tribal law, FLA. ATr'y GEN.
Op. 10 (1961-62).
279. Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950). On extradition under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law (FLA. STAT. § 88.011, 1965), Cox v. State, 180
So.2d 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; and Clarke v. Blackburn, 151 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
280. 173 So.2d 769, 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
281. 180 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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tion to modify the decree by way of supersession of its terms and provisions in accordance with Section 742.06 Fla. Stats." This the court would
be willing to do regardless of the fact that both mother and child reside
in California and only the father is a Florida resident.
Jurisdictional aspects in relation to a foreign alimony decree arose
in Borst v. Borst2" 2 which involved an action by a divorced husband
against his nonresident former wife to modify a New York alimony
decree under section 65.15, Florida Statutes. The appellate court affirmed
an order of dismissal on the ground that "where the Florida court has no
jurisdiction over the marriage, the divorce, the alimony decree, or the
wife, the court is unable, under due process of law, to affect alimony
rights vested in the wife, these rights being personal and subject only
to the in personam jurisdiction over the wife."2 ' The court reached this
decision on the authority of the trilogy of Estin
v. Estin, s4 Armstrong v.
2 6
Armstrong,286 and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt. 1

The effect, in Florida, of a separation agreement incorporated by
reference into a Nevada divorce decree, by which the now deceased husband agreed to pay a monthly sum to his divorced wife as alimony "during
her life or until she remarried," was discussed in Hazlewood v. Hazlewood. 2 7 Difficulties apparently arose from a Nevada statute2 s8 providing
that:
In the event of the death of either party or the subsequent
remarriage of the wife, all alimony awarded by the decree shall
cease unless it shall have been otherwise ordered by the court.
Both the trial and the appellate courts thought that this statute would
apply if the Nevada court had awarded alimony, but without considering
the question of Nevada law in cases where the parties have made a
different agreement. However, after finding that alimony had not been
awarded by the Nevada decree and also finding that "this statute is the
same as the law of Florida, ' 28 9 the appellate court held that the "decree
of the Nevada court did not order alimony but was, in effect, an approval
of the property settlement made between the parties."2 The court,
therefore, affirmed judgment for plaintiff. It is interesting to note that the
court did not explain why it tested the alimony agreement against both
282. 161 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
283. Id. at 696.

284.
285.
286.
287.

334
350
354
178

U.S. 541 (1948).
U.S. 568 (1956).
U.S. 416 (1957).
So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
288. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(4) (1963).
289. 178 So.2d 752, 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
290. Id. at 757.
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Nevada and Florida law, and why it omitted to consider the Nevada decree in the light of the full faith and credit clause.
7. MARITAL PROPERTY
The impact of divorce on the property held by the former spouses
may be effected by a judicial decision included in the divorce decree or
as an automatic consequence of that decree. In Florida, the mere fact of
a valid divorce decree transforms an estate by entirety into a joint tenancy, 9 ' and, under section 731.101, Florida Statutes, a former spouse
loses the right to take under a will executed by the other spouse. On the
death of one of the spouses, alimony will also stop unless there has been
an agreement between the spouses, binding upon the estate of the
promisor.2 92
A divorced wife elected dower under section 731.34, Florida Statutes,
and pressed her claim against the executor of the deceased husband's
estate, demanding that the ex parte Florida divorce decree recovered by
the husband be set aside and that the divorce be declared so as not to
affect her claim to dower. After the trial court dismissed the demand, its
decision had been affirmed on appeal." 3 The Florida supreme court
declined to review the case,294 but the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held 295 that the previous New York separation
decree could not be construed as "creating or preserving any interest in
the nature of or in lieu of dower in any property of the decedent wherever
located," 9 nor did the plaintiff show that New York law supports her
position. The court held that denial of dower by Florida courts was not
a violation of the full faith and credit clause insofar as the New York
decree. In regard to the plaintiff's argument that the Florida divorce
court had no power to extinguish her dower rights since the divorce
court did not have in personam jurisdiction over her, the Court retorted
that "under Florida law, no dower right survives the [divorce] decree"
and concluded that "Florida courts transgressed no constitutional bounds
in denying petitioner's dower in her ex-husband's Florida estate. 29 7
The enforceability of a Florida divorce decree ordering a transfer of
title to land in a sister state was discussed elsewhere in this study. It
may be added that an ex parte Florida divorce was held not to convert
title to real property in New York held by the spouses as tenants by the
entireties, into a tenancy in common.2 98
291. Burns v. Burns, 174 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
292. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So.2d 276 (1964).
293. Simmons v. Miami Beach First Natl Bank, 157 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
294. 166 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1964).
295. 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
296. Id. at 84-85.
297. Id. at 86. Sufficiency of constructive service of process in action by spouse to
establish title to interest in realty awarded to wife by divorce decree, Hennig v. Hennig, 178
So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), petition for cert. dismissed, 185 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1966).
298. Huber v. Huber, 26 N.Y. Misc. 2d 539, 209 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1960).
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CUSTODY

Surprisingly few cases have been reported lately dealing with conflict problems of custody. Two cases deal with custody problems triggered
by habeas corpus proceedings subsequent to a sister state custody decree.
In both cases," 9' the appellate courts held that trial courts, having jurisdiction over the children and over the other interested parties, had erroneously declined to consider the question of custody anew on the merits,
but had instead simply enforced a foreign decree. In one case, the court
advised the trial judge that he "may properly consider the New Jersey
decree as a factor in deciding the custody issue;" however, the court
continued, "he is not bound by the full faith and credit clause to automatically enforce the New Jersey decree."8 ° Of course, the court may, in its
discretion, enforce the foreign decree, but only after having determined
whether it is in the "best interests of the child to do so."'so l The court also
supplied the trial judge with several guidelines for "determining whether
a foreign decree is entitled to recognition under the comity principle in a
custody case." Factors to be considered include: "(1) the length of time
which has elapsed since the decree; (2) whether the custody issue was
actively litigated by the same parties now before the court; and (3)
whether there has been a change in any material circumstances affecting
the fitness of the parties relevant to the custody of the child."' 2 Similarly,
in the other case, the appellate court held "that when a court of this state
has jurisdiction of the parties and of the children in such a contest
relating to their custody, notwithstanding a final order conferring custody
on the one or the other may have been made in a foreign state,... it is
to custody on its merits.) ; 8 3

the duty of the court to decide the issue as
9.

ADOPTION

The holding of the Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Manzo30 4 regarding the due process requirement of the notice owed to a divorced
father deserves mention. The substantive effects of adoption have recently
299. Morris v. Kridel, 179 So.2d 130 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Fox v. Fox, 179 So.2d 103
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
300. Morris v. Kridel, 179 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
301. Ibid.
302. Ibid.
303. Fox v. Fox, 179 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). In Cassidy v. Cassidy, 181
So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), the court restated the rule that "A wife may proceed in a
common law action in this state to secure a money judgment for delinquent alimony or
child support, awarded by a divorce decree entered in another state, as to all installments
which have accrued and are not subject to subsequent modification." However, under the
circumstances presented by the particular case, the court rejected the wife's claim in view
of the fact that, subsequent to the support decree, the Illinois divorce court had transferred
custody to the father. This result was reached notwithstanding the fact that at the time of
the custody transfer, the child was outside of Illinois.
304. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
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been extended by including among the rights and duties passing from the
natural parents to the adoptor "any cause of action for wrongful death." '
10.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

It may be noted in passing that an action to determine the paternity
of an illegitimate child against the former president of a Latin American
republic, about to be extradited, was dismissed because of the plaintiff's
failure to allege in her complaint the exact statutory elements of such an
action, i.e., that she was unmarried and that the child was born out of
wedlock. 8
According to section 856.04 of the Florida Statutes, as amended in
1965, the charge of desertion may also be brought on behalf of the
illegitimate child "of a man who has been adjudged or decreed to be the
father of such illegitimate child by a court of competent jurisdiction
in this state or in any other jurisdiction."80 7
F. Decedents' Estates
The determination of the law controlling a contract to make a will
was involved in Sawyer v. Inglis."' The plaintiff-son contended that his
parents had made such contract in their mutual will, executed in Wisconsin, and, in the instant suit, demanded the specific performance of
that agreement. However, applying the law of the place where the mutual
wills had been executed (Wisconsin), the court found that Wisconsin
law, like that of Florida, the last domicile of the decedents recognized
the validity of contracts to make a will, but, as in Florida, the validity of
such agreements was subject to satisfying specific requirements. In
Florida, such an agreement must be in writing, and, in Wisconsin, "in order
for wills, other than joint wills, to constitute a contract, such agreement
must affirmatively appear in expressed language on the face of a joint
will." ' 9 The court dismissed the complaint because it did not find sufficient proof that an agreement to make a will had been concluded.
The escheat of an allegedly heirless estate to the state of Florida was
litigated In re Tim's Estate 10 Starting from the general rule that escheat
is not favored by law, the appellate court reversed a lower court decision
in favor of the state. It held that, as against the state, New York court
proceedings had established the relationship of some of the claimants
305. FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1965).
306. Lorenz v. Jiminez, 163 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
307. FLA. STAT. § 856.04(2) (1965). Cf., In re Adoption of Lee, 174 So.2d 87 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1965). A Greek adoption was involved in Corbett v. Stergios, 137 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa
1965) ; see Survey I, supra note 264, at 318.
308. 174 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
309. Id. at 766.
310. 161 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), quashed, 180 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1965).
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to the estate. However, the court found that Florida was the decedent's
last domicile and held that Florida had jurisdiction to determine succession to the decedent's personal property wherever it might be situated,
and that it was not bound by the laws of any other state. 1'
G. Corporations
In Crane Co. v. Richardson Constr. Co.,312 the court discussed the
application of the Florida statute which imposes personal liability for
corporate obligations upon the corporate directors or officers whenever
the corporation pays the claims of the latter against it, while it refuses
to pay other claims.81 Interpreting the statute in regard to its application
to a foreign (Bahamian) corporation, the court noted that the provision
imposing liability was first enacted in Florida in 1925, and that it was
patterned after a New York corporation law of 1893. After a New York
court had decided, in 1894, that their statute applied only to domestic corporations, the New York Legislature, in 1897, and long before the enactment of the Florida statute involved in the instant case, expressly extended
the applicability of its statute to foreign corporations transacting or doing
business in New York State. In view of this fact, the appellate court
concluded that the earlier, not the later, New York statute had been
adopted in Florida and that, consequently, the Florida statute is
inapplicable to foreign corporations even though they may engage in or
transact business in Florida." 4
H. Criminal Conflict Law
In Rogers v. United States,"'3 the fifth circuit affirmed a conviction
for the illegal transportation of counterfeit debentures from Miami to
Nassau, Bahamas, in violation of section 2314, 18 United States Code.
In another case, the accused had been returned to Florida from the
Bahamas on a warrant not signed by the governor, nor on accused's
17
waiver of extradition. 16 The court ruled that in view of Ker v. Illinois"
and Frisbiev. Collins"' the defendant was not entitled to relief; the court
quoted from the latter case and held that "the power of a court to try a
person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction' ... There
is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty
311. Taxation of Florida estates, Green v. State, 166 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1964).
312. 312 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1965).
313. FLa. STAT. § 608.55 (1965).
314. See also Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962), involving a stockholders'
derivative action on behalf of a Venezuelan corporation.
315. 334 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1964).
316. Hunter v. State, 174 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
317. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
318. 342 U.S. $19 (1952).
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person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to
trial against his will."' 9
I. Tax Conflict Law
The amenability of foreign corporations to Florida tax was litigated
in two reported cases. One... involved the payment of a gross receipts tax
by a New York corporation; the other 2' was concerned with the taxation
of equipment manufactured and sold by a taxpayer to a foreign purchaser.
The amenability of a Florida corporation, engaged in government
contract work in the Virgin Islands, to local taxation was in issue in Jefferson Constr. Overseas, Inc. v. Government of Virgin Islands."'
319.
320.
321.
322.

174 So.2d 415, 416 (Fla. 1965).
Green v. Sesac, Inc., 177 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
State v. Green, 177 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
237 F. Supp. 125 (D.V.I. 1964).

